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My classmates and I, at one graduate student get-together, were re-
marking on the resurgence of doctor and lawyer shows on television when
one of our number suggested "Why not a show about economists?" The
response was enthusiastic (after all, we were economics graduate stu-
dents). The possibilities were limitless. One week The Economist would
gallop in a silver steed to rescue the country-or the world-from a de-
pression. The next week The Economist would, by deft manipulation of
myriad macroeconomic levers, fine-tune the economy, enhancing the qual-
ity of life for all.' From the settlement of international trade wars to ex-
plorations of the mystique of gold,2 The Economist could leap tall crises
in a single bound. Clearly, the day-to-day fate of Everyman as well as the
wealth of nations rested in The Economist's hands.3 The dearth of such a
series came to be inexplicable.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. I wish to thank Ed Baker, Peter Carsten-
sen, Carin Clauss, William Clune, Hendrik Hartog, Willard Hurst, Phillip Muehrcke, Roberta Ro-
mano, and William Whitford for their thoughtful comments. I am also indebted to Michael Morgalla
of the Wisconsin Law Library for his kindness and diligence in scouting out often obscure sources,
and to Karen Loebel and Lynette Zigman for research assistance.Errors remaining are my own.
1. This sequence of episodes perhaps dates this sentiment to the early 1970's. See L. THUROW,
DANGEROUS CURRENTS: THE STATE OF ECONOMIcS 30-32 (1983) (describing "age of economic
imperialism").
2. See, e.g., Machlup, Speculations on Gold Speculation, 59 AM. ECON. REv. 332 (1969) (papers
and proceedings of 81st annual meeting); Samuelson, The Mystique of Gold, 3 VAND. J. ECON. &
Bus. 1 (1977); Scitovsky, A Reconsideration of the Theory of Tariffs, 9 REV. ECoN. STUD. 89 (1942).
3. See J. HicKs, VALUE AND CAPITAL (2d ed. 1946); J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1935); A. SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); Ehr-
lich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question ofLife and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV.
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Despite the conspicuous and altogether mysterious absence of econo-
mists from the ranks of television heroes, The Economist, or at least eco-
nomics, has nevertheless moved into the theatre of the legitimate, that is to
say, into American law schools. There economics has attained a promi-
nence thus far eluding it in television: Within the legal literature, as well
as in hallway conversations, The Economist's roles range from Magician-
Saviour to Nastiest Villain, with few instances betwixt the two.4 Which
role it is, and when, and where, seems to vary from school to school, from
course to course, and indeed from one economist (or economics-y lawyer)
to another.5 There is, I think, no unified vision about what the place of
economics in law should be. The divergence derives in part from the new-
ness of the economics presence;6 and in part from the rich diversity of the
economics enterprise, with the widening play given to economists' imagi-
nations.7 The former is likely to decline with time; one hopes the latter
will not.
A third source of the divergence, however, presents a more fundamental
challenge to the long run viability (and indeed, the long run) of The
Economist at its new performing home. This third source is a collection of
pit-of-the-stomach-type reservations about much of economics and law, as
currently played out. These reservations link to the core of the law and
economics inquiry because they link to the core question of what scientific
inquiry itself is all about. But more of that later when we go about con-
structing a screenplay.' First,
397 (1975); Zeckhauser, Procedures of Valuing Lives, 23 PuB. PoL'y 419 (1975).
4. For a sampling of some of the many viewpoints, see Baker, The Ideology of the Economic
Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PuB. AnF. 3 (1975); Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 769;
Michelman, Norms and Nornativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1015 (1978);
Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CH. L. REv. 281 (1979); Symposium on
Efficiency As a Legal Concern, 8 Hors-rA L. REv. 485 (1980); Change in the Common Law: Legal
and Economic Perspectives, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. (1980); A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 811 (1980).
5. See Hansmann, The Current State of Law and Economics Scholarship, J. LEGAL EDC. 217
(1983); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Programs: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387
(1981); Klevorick, Reflections on "The Current State of Law-and-Economics Scholarship", 33 J. LE-
GAL EDuc. 239 (1983); Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our
Worse-Than-Second-Best World. A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the
Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 950; Schwartz, The Future of Economics in Legal
Education: The Prospects for a New Model Curriculum, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 314 (1983); Krier, Book
Review, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1664, 1665 (1974) ("Economic analysis of central legal issues seems to
foment storms where otherwise only mild breezes blow.").
6. See THE ECONOMIC APPRoAcH TO LAW 1, 2-5 (P. Burrows & C. Veljanovski eds. 1981);
Breyer, Economics for Lauyers and Judges, 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 294 (1983); Leff, Economic Analysis
of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974) (interpreting history of law
and economies within general context of legal scholarship); Posner, supra note 4, at 281-87.
7. E.g., Akerlof & Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. EcoN.
REv. 307 (1982); Becker, Crime and Punishment; An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL. EcoN. 169
(1968); Chalmers & Shelton, An Economic Analysis of Riot Participation, 13 ECON. INQUIRY 322
(1975); Fair, A Theory of Extramarital Affairs, 86 J. PoUTr. ECON. 45 (1978).




A. Mitchell Polinsky, who brings us this adventure, is no stranger to
the O-K Corral. A steady and surefingered sharpshooter, he is one of the
best, or even the very best, economist in the field of economics and law. In
showdowns ranging from criminal sanctions9 to contract remedies,10 his
hulking scholarly presence has sent Ignorance a-scrambling, first to the
bushes, and then, by sundown, out of town.
Although he does not abstain from the hard stuff, in this episode, writ-
ten for the uninitiated, the approach is decidedly different. In this book,1"
an introductory text, he strides courageously into the law and economics
saloon and orders a glass of milk. Aware that to those just entering the
saloon, exhaustive texts can be exhausting as well, Professor Polinsky
targets for himself a different task. An Introduction to Law and Econom-
ics aims for a single, simple silhouette forsaking the false heroism of scat-
tershots into the brush. A compact, concise little textbook, it offers other
pluses as well: In addition to serving the first year law and undergraduate
courses for which it was originally written, it easily lends itself also to
spot reading by those with special subject interests in contracts, torts,
criminal law, and other fields.
In my opinion, the book succeeds admirably at the tasks Professor Po-
linsky has set for it. Moreover, he has, in my view, set the right tasks.
Instead of seeking to "comprehensively survey the many areas of law to
which economic analysis has been applied,"'" Professor Polinsky's goal is
"to convey the spirit of the economic approach and the insights gained
thereby."1" In other words, he aims to help the reader learn "how to think
like an economist."'' 4 To those that regularly recite the importance of
learning to think like a lawyer, this promise of the book should be a wel-
come one. Polinsky pledges to treat his subject "without the technical ap-
paratus,"15 and he is a man of his word.'"
9. Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probablility and Magnitude of Fines,
69 AM. ECON. REv. 880 (1979).
10. Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427
(1983).






16. This is not to say that the analysis portrayed is nontechnical. Indeed, the author often presents
quite sophisticated analyses in a very readable, nontechnical form. See, e.g., pp. 51-56 (discussion of
concepts of risk, insurance, and moral hazard). The level of this "hidden technical apparatus" varies,
however, and does so, I would guess, as a function of the sophistication of the available professional
literature upon which Polinsky relies. Wisely, he limits the citations to this literature in the main
body of the book, and offers the citations in a "Bibliographical Appendix," pp. 127-33.
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The book pursues a spiraling course, beginning with introductory mate-
rial about the role of assumptions and about the particular assumptions
and definitions employed in the volume.17 Succeeding chapters present
and apply the Coase Theorem and related concepts to nuisance, breach of
contract, and automobile accidents.1 After a brief pause to present notions
of risk bearing and insurance, 9 the book cycles round again past contracts
and auto accidents, then on to law enforcement, pollution control, and
products liability.20 A nice little chapter midway through on "Competitive
Markets" 1 highlights and explains clearly the most important concepts
usually pursued in a course devoted solely to intermediate
microeconomics. The book then spirals again, returning to the point from
which it began, to reconsider the economic consequences and incentives
associated with legal rules and institutions.2" Each cycle of the spiral is
more sophisticated thah the last; by this means, the author is able to lead
the newcomer to a level where the fast-becoming-classics of the field"3 will
be readily accessible. It is also the spiral pattern that permits the reader
with special subject interests to join in the progression, depart from it, and
then rejoin at the next higher level without a great loss in continuity.
With exceptional clarity, Professor Polinsky presents an economic in-
quiry that is at once both a fine demonstration of how an economist might
approach these subjects, and an example of why in doing so it can be
difficult, for Polinsky or for anybody, to please all of the people all of the
time. Let me offer his analysis of nuisance law" (and after that, some
devil's advocacy to it) as an illustration. Having previously asserted that
concepts of equity can be separated from that of efficiency,2" Polinsky fo-
cuses for most of the book on efficiency considerations, and so the effi-
ciency effects of nuisance law are the subject of this chapter.
In presenting an economic analysis of nuisance law issues, Polinsky of-
17. Pp. 2-5.
18. Pp. 15-24; 25-36; 37-49.
19. Pp. 51-56.
20. Pp. 57-63; 65-71; 73-84; 89-94; 95-104.
21. Pp. 85-88.
22. Pp. 105-13 (discussing relative advantages and desirability of conducting redistribution by the
use of legal rules, as contrasted with taxes and transfer payments).
23. E.g., G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); W. Hmsc-, LAW AND ECONOMICS:
AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (1979); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). For
more extensive references to the literature, see Professor Polinsky's bibliographic appendix, pp.
127-33; Cooter, Law and the Inperialisn of Economics: An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of
Law and a Review of the Major Books, 29 UCLA L. REv. 1260 (1982); sources cited in footnote 4.
24. Pp. 15-24.
25. Pp. xiv-xv; 7-10. The author also returns at the close of the book to reconsider the equity-
efficiency relationship. Pp. 105-13. At that point, he concludes that although a tradeoff betyween
equity and efficiency existys in theory,"legal rules . . . should [nevertheless] be based primarily on
efficiency considerations because legal rules are generally less precise than taxes and transfers as a
means of redistributing income and may be more costly." P. 113.
1590
Vol. 93: 1587, 1984
Law and Economics
fers for purposes of discussion the following example.2 6 A polluting fac-
tory, located next to a single resident, can obtain $10,000 in profit by
producing one unit of its product, and an additional $4,000 beyond that if
it produces a second. In the meantime, the neighboring resident would
suffer damage of $1,000 if the factory were to produce the one unit, but
his damages would soar to a total of $15,000 if the factory were to pro-
duce two. One can easily see that the factory owner and resident, were
they one and the same person,27 would between them have a $9,000 bene-
fit if one unit were produced (the factory's profit, diminished by the resi-
dent's damage); and would experience a negative net benefit in expanding
to two units, for the added $4,000 profit of the factory would be more
than offset by the additional $14,000 losses to the resident. Clearly the
best outcome from the point of view of the single resident-entrepreneur
would be to produce one unit of the product: Its $9,000 profit is prefera-
ble to the zero profit of not producing at all; and it avoids the cut-off-
your-nose-to-spite-your-face losses of producing more than one unit.
In a world of two people, and a world having injunctive or compensa-
tory relief, life is understandably more complicated, and it is here that
Professor Polinsky searches for the conditions under which the resident
and the polluter will achieve the same one-unit output result. Here, for
example, the $1,000 damage to the resident having a right to clean air28
together with the $10,000 profit possible for the factory owner imply that
agreement by the parties on any dollar value in between will be a mutu-
26. Pp. 16-17.
27. This preliminary device of viewing the resident and factory owner as a single individual is my
own rather than Professor Polinsky's. I adopt it here for ease of exposition and because, as discussed
below at pp. 1594-95, it also provides a useful reference point from which to consider the relationship
between individual self-interest and socially desirable outcomes. See infra pp. 1594-98.
28. As does Polinsky, pp. 16-17, 22, I assume that the $1000 and $10,000 figures capture all the
costs and benefits experienced by each of the parties. (Were this not so, it would be incorrect to assert
that the resident is precisely as happy with the damage payment as with the obviation of damage
altogether.) So, for example, the unpleasantness of smelling or breathing polluted air, even the aug-
mented unpleasantness attributable to individual, idiosyncratic sensitivity or preferences, is included in
the $1000 figure. This is an appropriate expositional simplification of the conceptual scheme em-
ployed by Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1092, 1106-10 (1972), on which Professor Polinsky relies in this
section. See p. 15 & n.8. Calabresi and Melamed use the terms "objective price" to mean the market-
based valuations of damages, and "subjective price" to signify the price at which exchange occurs if a
party's right to be free from injury is secured by a prohibitory injunction. Calabresi & Melamed,
supra. Consequently, when Professor Polinsky and I use the term "damages" here, we include, in
effect, both the subjective and the objective damages of the Calabresi-Melamed lexicon. However,
since the idiosyncratic element of injury is usually not compensated by damages, see p. 22 n.15, the
expositional device of including such injury in our calculation of damages means that we must keep
the definitional artifacts in mind when carrying the conclusions from the theory back to the real
world. See infra pp. 1598-1600; cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at 1092-93, 1106-09 (entitlement
of prohibitory injunction permits party to hold out for subjective price to be paid by other party,
whereas liability rule requires first party to "sell" at market-based price).
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ally beneficial outcome (as compared to no production at all). 9 Note that
this is true for any agreed payment level between the wishful-thinking
values of the parties: The factory owner would like to pay only $1,000,
and the resident would like to collect the whole $10,000 profit his sacrifice
makes possible, but these extreme cases are unlikely to occur.30
In this world of two people, both the damage remedy for the resident
and, an injunctive remedy where the parties are "cooperative" 31-that is,
where they come to some agreement on compensation-will result in pro-
duction of one unit, which Polinsky characterizes as the efficient output.3*
Moreover, assuming that the costs of transacting all this are zero, the
same production level would result if the entitlement, with damages or
injunctive relief, belonged to the factory instead. This is the implication of
the Coase Theorem," discussed more extensively by the author in Chap-
ter Three, and incorporated by reference here. '
But then, one asks, what if the rather restrictive assumptions adopted
here are not met? For example, what if the parties aren't "cooperative"?
Polinsky responds to this question by relaxing the assumption of "cooper-
ativeness," and by focusing on a world in which it is not guaranteed from
the outset that a negotiated agreement will be reached. 5 In addition to
29. Each outcome in this range is Pareto optimal, a term for which Polinsky has offered a succinct
definition:
A situation is said to be... Pareto optimal if there is no change from that situation that can
make someone better off without making someone else worse off.
P. 7 n.4. Moreover, since each party is at least as well off at any particular point in the bargainable
range as it would be with a standoff situation, a standoff is not Pareto optimal under the conditions
assumed in our example.
30. The outcome in such cases of bilateral monopoly, see infra p. 1595 & n.44, will depend on the
relative bargaining strength of the parties. See K. COHEN & R. CYERT, THEORY OF THE FtMs:
RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN A MiTxrr ECONOMY 278-81 (1965); see generally J. CROSS, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF BARGAINING 3-41 (reviewing bargaining problem and bargaining theories); J. VON NEU-
MANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944) (alternative
theoretical approaches to problems of indeterminacy involving two or more parties). Most likely, the
parties will share the bargainable difference in some fashion. See infra note 45; J. HENDERSON & R.
QUANDT, MICROECONOMic THEORY 244-46 (2d ed. 1971) (outcome in which one party dominates
and forces other to accept its price or quantity decisions is but one of several possible outcomes).
Some theorists have asserted that the course of the bargaining itself (apart from characteristics of
the parties and pre-bargaining conditions) affects the bargained outcome or the failure to reach agree-
ment. See, e.g., R. WALTON & R. McKmsni, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS
58-125 (1965). Indeed, although the complexity of such theories is beyond the range of Professor
Polinsky's introductory text, their spirit is very much in keeping with that of his analysis of
noncooperation.
31. P. 17.
32. Pp. 17, 19-20.
33. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (under certain restrictive condi-
tions, choice of liability rule does not affect resource allocation by two parties to transaction, although
rule may affect their wealth); cf. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Alocation and Liability.
Rules-A Connent, 11 J.L. & EcoN 67 (1968); Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1982).
34. Pp. 11-14 (discussion of Coase Theorem); 15 (reference to previous chapter).
35. Pp. 18-19.
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showing that a damages remedy will still lead to production of one unit
(and a bargain basement payment of $1000 to the resident),36 the author
considers the results of an injunctive rule.
Here, however, the production story turns out differently. Polinsky rea-
sons that if the parties do not reach agreement-if in the framework as
he's constructed it, one or both parties issue threats, engage in "stubborn
bargaining," "extortion"37 and suchlike-there would be no output at all,
i.e., zilch. This, the author says, is inefficient. He therefore proposes a
novel solution, namely an entitlement to the resident, enforceable by in-
junction, to a one-unit level of output."8 This forms an interesting variant
on the taxonomy proposed by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed,39
discussed in the text,'0 in which entitlements may be protected alterna-
tively by damages or by a prohibitory injuction. The reason for such a
rule, as presented by Polinsky, is not only the efficiency of the one-unit
outcome, but the fact that such an outcome is a stable equilibrium. In less
technical terms than I have used here, Polinsky presents an excellent ex-
planation of this:
Under the injunctive remedy. . . the factory could produce one unit,
but no more, without having to obtain the permission of the resident.
Starting at one unit of output, it would not be mutually beneficial to
produce a second or third unit since the factory's gains are less than
the resident's losses. Likewise, it would not be mutually beneficial to
reduce output to zero since the resident's gain (in the form of re-
duced damages) is less than the factory's losses (in the form of re-
duced profits). Thus, starting at an intermediate entitlement of one
unit, the parties will remain there. In essence, the reason strategic
behavior cannot upset this outcome is that there are no beneficial
changes that can be made and that would require negotiation.41




39. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28; see Michelman, Pollution as a Tortr A Non-Accidental
Perspective on Calabresi's Costs (Book Review), 80 YALE L.J. 647, 669-73 (1971) (extending theo-
retical development of G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS in context of nuisance law).
40. P. 15. Polinsky initially relies upon the Caabresi and Melamed concepts and language, but
then builds his own analytical framework, Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Eco-
nomics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1075 (1980), which he explicates in
simplified form in this text.
41. Pp. 18-19.
42. In Polinsky's lexicon, "strategic behavior" constitutes merely a form of transaction cost, rather
than a form of interchange such as negotiation. It is a transaction cost not because it is costly in out-
of-pocket terms, but because "it may prevent the parties from reaching an efficient agreement." Id. at
18 n. 11. Now, in a Coase world, see Coase, supra note 33, the one thing that is unequivocally good is
the reduction of transaction costs. Therefore, once the behavior of freely bargaining actors has been
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ages remedy will lead to an "efficient" level of production, but an absolute
injunctive remedy will not; as a surrogate for the latter, he recommends
an injunctive remedy for production levels above one unit.43
Now, I want to examine in greater detail the development of the analy-
sis of nuisance just described, and suggest why in such a context the be-
holder's eye may make a difference. Recall that although all the outcomes
between $1000 and $10,000 are Pareto optimal, they are not equally at-
tractive from the respective partisan points of view. Clearly, the resident
prefers payments that are high to ones that are low, and the factory owner
prefers just the reverse. In a world with no outside decisionmaker such as
a legislature or a court, the outcome here is indeterminate. There is no
obvious "right answer" as to the level of payment at which exchange
should occur; this is the (in)famous problem of bilateral monopoly.44
At this point, one could, however, continue the development of the the-
ory by examining bargaining behavior and suggest from that the outcome
likely to result.45 Polinsky in this book does not pursue such a bargaining
theory route. Instead, construing the possibility of deadlock as a danger
worth avoiding, from the point of view of Someone-or-other, he turns to
the court46 to provide a determinate solution. Someone-or-other, or the
court, must therefore be a person able to take a broader view of things
than does either of the parties. I have no objections to this construction as
defined to be a transaction cost, the obviation of such negotiation is readily seen to be good. This set of
assumptions leads to one way of analyzing nuisance problems, but it simultaneously limits the theory's
applicability, as do all theory-building assumptions. For example, Professor Polinsky's conclusions
about the efficiency consequences of the suggested damages and injunctive remedies (accepting his
definition of efficiency) will not necessarily follow in a world in which negotiation or "strategic behav-
ior" serves any constructive purpose. Strong assumptions such as he has made in this section of the
book are defensible and indeed necessary to the simplification process associated with writing an intro-
ductory text. But they simultaneously impose limitations on one's ability to draw from the model
conclusions immediately applicable in the real world.
43. Pp. 18-19. This example "illustrates a general principle: Under the injunctive remedy, in
order to overcome strategic behavior it is necessary to choose an entitlement corresponding to the
efficient outcome," p. 19, because otherwise it would be necessary for the parties to reach agreement
in order to get the efficient outcome.
44. See K. COHEN & R. CYERT, supra note 30, at 279-80, 284; cf. F. EDGEWORTH, MATHE-
MATICAL Psychics 20-25, 28-30, 35 (London 1881) (reprinted 1932) (in exchange between one buyer
and one seller there will generally be an infinite set of Pareto optimal solutions, and within that set,
yet another infinite set, the "contract curve", on which each point represents an improved position
relative to particular starting points). Within the parlance of bilateral monopoly, Polinsky's suggestion
that payment should not exceed the resident's damages of $1000 is equivalent to a suggestion that the
indeterminacy be resolved totally in favor of the buyer of the product. See also supra, note 30.
45. See, e.g., J. HIcKs, THE THEORY OF WAGES 136-58 (2d ed. 1963) (concessions by manage-
ment and resistance by labor union depend upon expected length of strike); T. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 21-172 (1960) (theory of bargaining, games, and strategic behavior);
Ashenfelter & Johnson, Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity, 59 AM.
ECON. REv. 35 (1969) (theory of negotiation and strike frequency and duration); J. Lachman, An
Economic Model of Plea Bargaining in the Criminal Court System 84-93, 135-36 (1975) (Ph.D.
dissertation, available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan) (theory in which parties




it stands. I would, however, highlight the facts that in Polinsky's world,
the court and the Someone are outside the resident-factory owner nexus;
and, second, that this social decisionmaker apparently has an agenda of its
own-which may or may not accord with that of the reader.47
Consider the story both ways. Scenario 1: The parties, left to their own
devices, would agree to an exchange at a price in the middle of the
range-say, $5500. Preempting this negotiation event, however, Polinsky's
court would order payment of only $1000 damages, or adopt an injunction
guaranteeing production at one unit with no damages paid. It would in-
tervene in this way in an otherwise private transaction because to do oth-
erwise would risk the untoward consequences of deadlock."8
Justification for such intervention must then come from the beneficial
consequences of intervention in the case where the parties would not oth-
erwise have reached agreement; indeed, it must also be true that these
47. It is not clear exactly why, within the world of the self-interested economic person, the parties
do not reach an agreement that (except for the extreme positions of exactly $1000 and $10,000) is in
the self-interest of both of them. One possibility is that they are irrational-for example, that they act
in self-destructive ways-but that possibility has been foreclosed by the initial assumption of rational-
ity, and rationality in the form of self-interested behavior. See p. 10 (adopting assumption of consumer
sovereignty and assumption that individuals generally know what is best for themselves). A second
possibility is that the individuals are marching rationally, but to the beat of a different drummer.
Polinsky suggests as much in noting that parties may be attempting to establish reputations as "tough
bargainers," p. 18, rather than seeking the best solution as measured by dollars alone and in this one
negotiation episode. Suppose, then, that given these two goals-investing in the capital that is reputa-
tion and obtaining a desirable outcome in this particular episode-the bargainers find that what is in
their individual self-interest is to walk away from one another and do business elsewhere or do no
business at all. By this definition, deadlock is Pareto optimal: If there is no overlap between the
outcomes that improve well-being for one party and those that do so for the other, then each is at least
as well off in deadlock. On the other hand, if one wishes to suggest that reputational investment
should not be a goal, and that once it has been excised from the list of goals there is at least one
Pareto optimal outcome to be had from doing business together, then one has in effect acknowledged
the importance of goals in determining the efficient outcome. Cf. Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a
Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 1655, 1679-80 (1974) (efficiency is not independent of equity, given that redistribution is costly;
therefore, "the problem of designing the law, even within the economist's framework, is one of trading
off efficiency and equity"); but cf pp. 105-13 (despite costliness of redistribution and theoretical
existence of tradeoff between equity and efficiency, legal rules should be based primarily on efficiency,
with redistribution accomploished by taxes and transfers). How and why Professor Polinsky's views
on this subject have changed since his earlier review essay are not explained in the book, except for a
brief statement to the effect that they have changed, which appears in a footnote to the bibliographic
appendix. P. 131 n.74. This is the only thing in the book that I found not to be crystal clear.
48. A government that would honor such freely negotiated outcomes is not necessarily less in-
terventionist than a government that participates by overriding consumer sovereignty. See Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 28, at 1090 (presented with conflicting interests of two or more people, the state
must and, in effect, does decide which side to favor; the only rule that does not require government is
"might makes right"); Samuels, Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes, 14 J.L. &
ECON. 435 (1971) (by enforcing property rights, even in absence of specific statutory law, government
is indeed acting, and cannot be neutral as between parties having conflicting interests); cf Kennedy,
The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 211 (1979) ("the goal of
individual freedom is at the same time dependent on and incompatible with the communal coercive
action that is necessary to achieve it").
1595
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 93: 1587, 1984
benefits are substantial enough to overcome the presumed negative effects
of intervention in the first scenario.' 9
What then happens in the alternative case? Scenario 2: The bargainers,
to whom any agreement in the $1000 to $10,000 range is preferable to
deadlock, somehow muck things up. They stomp out of the negotiation
chamber in disgust and never return. Because each loses out on the poten-
tial gain offered by the dazzling array of Pareto optimal solutions, both
have plummeted to the depths, so to speak, of their joy-unit careers. In my
two-person world, the curtain then closes with the two of them left on
their island, sulking on their respective rocks.50
In Polinsky's world, however, the court dashes to the rescue to order
damages of $1000, or an injunction (and no damages) so that, in either
event, production occurs at the one-unit level. Now, measured in terms of
individual joy levels, one or both parties are at least as well off as if they'd
been sulking on the rocks for the rest of their lives: Under a damages
remedy, the court's solution to this world's problem is a Pareto optimal
one; the factory owner is $9000 richer and the resident is no worse off
than in the sulking case. With the one-unit injunction remedy, life is
$1000 rosier still for the factory owner and equivalently unrosier for the
resident, but, as in the damages case, we can at least rest assured that the
collectively desirable production will occur.
But wait. Who decided what is collectively desirable? Who is the collec-
tivity, if it's not the two rock people who have already made their decision
known? Take the easy questions first. In the damages version of Scenario
2, the one thing we know is that the parties that would have been sulking
49. Here I am assuming that freely-bargained outcomes are preferable from a social perspective to
outcomes arrived at by governmental intervention or fiat. The assumption is useful as a starting point
here (as a devil's advocate, perhaps), but it need not hold generally. "[A] case ... for interference
with consumer sovereignty . . . may derive from the role of leadership in a democratic society," R.
MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 14 (1959), for example, in areas such as regulation
of drug sales and of health facilities, and compulsory education. See also Steiner, The Public Sector
and the Public Interest, in PUBIC ExPENDITuIREs AND POLICY ANALYsIs 21, 23 (R. Haveman & J.
Margolis eds. 1970) (public goods include those for which the publicly provided version is qualita-
tively different from that of private market, as well as goods for which the only difference is in
distribution of benefits and costs).
50. Sad as this ending sounds, things could be worse: The two of them could, in ignorance be
daydreaming on their separate rocks, not even knowing enough to grieve about their lost opportunity
for bliss. Were this the case-which it is for Polinsky's third variant on the model, in which imperfect
information impedes the attainment of beneficial exchange, pp. 20-23-governmental intervention
would be relatively easier to justify. Government may intervene by changing the parties' starting
points, cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra nopte 28, at 1092, as Polinsky suggests, or by doing some-
thing else, such as providing or fostering the provision of better information. See, e.g., FEDERAL ME-
DIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, Tw rNTY-FouRTH ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1971 5-6
(making realistic reports to both labor and management constitutencies is important in order to avoid
work stoppages). This might not, however, be a panacea. See e.g., Lachman, supra note 45, at 14-16
(increased information available to one or both parties to bargaining may under some circumstances
widen bargaining interval, and poor information may under certain conditions lead to settlement
where perfect information would have led to conflict).
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on the rocks are doing at least as well, thanks to Polinsky's judge, as they
would have done in their alternative rocky existence. More specifically,
the resident is precisely as well off and the factory owner is $9000 better
off. Leaving aside the issues of distributive justice,51 we are still left with
several knotty issues. One: Even if government intervention can result in
one party being better off by $9000 and another holding constant in its
same old crummy position-even if this is possible-why do it? To restate
the question, if Polinsky's court can coerce the parties into a "better" out-
come, why is it so much better than the one they would have chosen, or
lapsed into, themselves? On what basis does the opinion of Polinsky's
court claim first dibs on the use of the term "better"?5" And, assuming
one can answer that question, is the court's solution so much better than
the free non-exchange one of the parties that its brownie-point glow will
carry over to justify court intervention even when the parties would other-
wise have worked out their own deal (Scenario 1)?
Why is it so important that one unit of production occur anyway? Po-
linsky's judge would answer that it is the "efficient" outcome,58 one that
"maximize[s] the size of the pie."" Is the pie bigger when the factory
owner produces one unit of the product? That depends on what you think
of the product, or, alternatively, what you think about the fact that other
folks are willing to pay big bucks for it. Suppose for the sake of argument,
you think that what others are willing to pay $10,000 for is indeed worth
that; and, moreover, that after these folks have thrown their money
around this way, it is the case that society as a whole is $10,000 better
off." (Just think about it: All this joy for a mere $10,000.) Now, ask
whether, for this joy, it is worth it-socially worth it-to have taken from
those bargainers the freedom to make their own decisions. Moreover, was
the resident's freedom to enjoy the clean air or to accept some payment
instead-now replaced by a governmental decision that he will breathe
muck and receive no compensation at all-was that earlier freedom worth
$10,000? And who ought to decide such questions: the resident, the fac-
51. This is no small matter to leave aside. See Polinsky, supra note 47, at 1679 (determination of
legal rules involves tradeoffs between equity and efficiency); Thurow, Equity Versus Efficiency in Law
Enforcement, 18 PuB. PoL'Y 451 (1970); see also Baker, Starting Points in the Economic Analysis of
Law, 8 HOFSrRA L. REv. 939 (1980) (wealth maximization criterion dependent on difficult to mea-
sure willingness-to-pay variable); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 28, at 1098 (preferences about
wealth distribution play crucial role in the setting of entitlements).
52. Would it matter, for example, if the gain to the factory owner were only fifty cents?
53. P. 18.
54. P. 7. But see Bebchuk, The Pursuit of A Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8
Hos'rRA L. REv. 671, 671-72, 694-709 (1980) (under Posner's wealth-maximization criterion, poor
may well get smaller slice, but this need not be true for other wealth-maximizing rules).
55. Approximating the public value of a good or activity by the price at which it is privately
exchanged is a common simplifying assumption of economics. At times, however, such an assumption
is inappropriate-for example, when the "good" exchanged is a murder for hire.
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tory owner, Polinsky's court, or Someone else?56 If one can answer yes in
litany to the questions posed above about worth, and if one can declare the
court or Someone else to be the best decisionmaker of all-only then need
the one unit solution be the efficient one.57
The answers to these questions are things on which reasonable people,
including economists, can disagree. No easy answers, indeed, no answers
at all can I offer. And that's the point. In this context, any rule of deci-
sion, whether it be a laissez-faire strategy that accepts the prospect of
sulking on the rocks, or a more activist role for a court or Someone
else-any such rule of decision is a statement about social values and
goals. The existence and authority of Polinsky's court, as well as any inti-
mations about what is "desirable," ' constitute statements about values,
namely, that given the hypothesized circumstances of production and re-
siding, the exercise of governmental authority to override private choice is
OK. My devil's advocacy presents the same conclusion in reflected form:
The decision not to intervene, the decision that the market, even when
there's a monopoly seller or buyer, is always right, is also a statement
about values. There is, to my thinking, no value-free way to define effi-
ciency 59 (a position at times espoused by Polinsky as well"). The conun-
drum is unavoidable. How, then, to make the best of a distressing
situation?
A Word From A Sponsor: Abstractions and Their Assumptions
Fortunately for us-and despite Professor Polinsky's humble caveats to
the contrary" 1-his book comes equipped with everything. In particular, it
56. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 91-101 (1982).
57. This assumes Polinsky's definition of efficiency. See supra p. 1597.
58. E.g, p. 119 ("it is desirable to reduce the risk borne by a risk-averse party"). The desirability
to risk-averse persons of reducing risks has been explained and illustrated well in the chapter on risk
bearing and insurance. Pp. 51-56. The social desirability of seeking such benefits for individu-
als-where this goal must be traded off against others in society-is a more complex issue.
59. To illustrate the relationship between efficiency and goals, suppose that you have determined
to take a vacation in London, and order airline tickets from a travel agent in accordance with this
plan. You have informed the agent of your preferences about dates, your willingness to tolerate
layovers for connecting flights, desire for flexibility to change schedules while en route, price of the
ticket, and so forth. Yet when you go to pick up the ticket, you find that it's a ticket to Miami instead.
The agent explains that Miami tickets are on special, and so it's the most efficient ticket you could
buy. The agent is right, if efficiency is independent of goals like going to London versus Miami, and if
the measure of achievement is pure dollar-cost minimization, rather than some combination of factors
that takes into account the aspects other than dollar cost, such as flexibility in travel plans while on
the trip. To say that one must first attend to expanding the size of the pie by pursuing the cost-
minimization course and then attend to goals is to suggest that you go to Miami and then go to
London, probably one of the less efficient ways to manage things. And so on. For an explication of
similar equity-efficiency tradeoffs in another context, that of law enforcement, see Thurow, supra
note 51.
60. See Polinsky, supra note 47, at 1679-80.
61. P. xiii.
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comes equipped with an early chapter about the role of assumptions, and
about the uses of abstraction in the process of economic inquiry.62 There
Polinsky points out that "[e]conomists make assumptions for the obvious
reason that the world, viewed economically, is too complicated to under-
stand without some abstraction."6 He therefore suggests isolating one or
two issues at a time "by making simplifying assumptions that eliminate
the others,"" 4 and later expanding the inquiry by adding various compli-
cations to the framework.6 5 In other words, the challenge of economic
thinking is the proper use of abstraction; in determining how properly to
use abstraction, one needs to take into account concerns about tractability,
the realism of assumptions, the particular questions to be pursued, and
the relationship of the assumptions to the goals of the inquiry. To use
Polinsky's phrasing, "[t]he art of economics is picking assumptions that
simplify a problem enough to better understand certain features of it,
without inevitably causing those features to be unimportant ones." 66
Because the process of economic abstraction is, by assumption, unfamil-
iar to the book's readers, I approach it by analogy to a more familiar
concept, specifically, to abstraction in the form of maps. A map is an ab-
straction of the world, and its use requires a theory by which one can link
the abstraction with the world.67 Before this linkage is established, how-
ever, one needs to know the questions the map should answer. Humbug.
A map is a map is a map, you say? Then, by all means, help yourself to a
soundscape map of Boston: "A composite view of the variety of city
sounds as perceived along a sequence of streets . . . [in which s]ymbols
represent qualities of sounds . . ., for example, soft, intense, roaring,
muffled, sharp, echoing, expansive."6" Or if that's not quite what you had
in mind, how about an Eskimo Coastline Relief Carving (yes, you read






67. See, e.g., A. ROBINSON, R. SALE & J. MORRISON, ELEMENTS OF CARTOGRAPHY 50-75 (4th
ed. 1978) (theory and systems of transformation for map projections); id. at 149- 80 (theories of
cartographic generalization); Board, Maps as Models, in MODELS IN GEOGRAPHY 671 (R. Chorley &
P. Haggett, eds. 1967); Lam, Spatial Interpolation Methods: A Review, 10 AM. CARTOGRAPHER 129
(1983).
68. M. SOUTHWOR1II & S. Sou'-wORTH, MAPS 190 (1982).
69. L. BAGROW & R. SKELTON, MEsISER DER KARTOGRAPHIE (1973), reprinted in M. SouTH-
woRTH & S. SOUTHWORTH, supra note 68, at 51. For examples of map abstractions of a different
sort, see M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, THE STATE OF THE WORLD ATLAS, map no. 29 (1981) (entitled
"Bullets and Blackboards," map depicts ratios of soldiers to teachers, by country, in 1974); G. Bula,
Gospel Temperance Railroad Map (1908), reprinted in AN ATLAS OF FANTASY 33-35 (J. Post ed.
1973) (Railroad of Life can go past Mount Terror into State of Darkness or take more northerly
route toward Celestial City).
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color-coded map showing "The Percent of [the U.S] Popu.ation Un-
churched . . .1971"?7° And so on.
Somehow, these maps offer little help in getting from Madison to Chi-
cago. Instead I want a road map, and a certain kind at that: I need to be
given the details of the street plan for the cities at each end, but not such
details for everywhere in between. I need to know about the roads, and
seasonal temperature and precipitation indicators would be nice. What
about cloud movements, wind direction and color-keyed info on vegeta-
tion? National and local parks, population centers, and Howard Johnson
restaurants? The map darkens progressively with colors and symbols, and
darkens still some more until . . . until I notice that even as I gave free
rein to my desire to know more, I consigned myself to a map from which
I could only know less.
This is the paradox of abstraction to which Polinsky succinctly re-
ferred:71 The skillful use of abstraction requires one to forego including
some considerations that would indeed add information, so that the result-
ing abstraction will, in the end, tell us more. In other words, even as one
chooses which details or assumptions to include, she necessarily chooses an
overall level of complexity appropriate to the task.72 This choice then con-
stitutes a fund, a budget of complexity, from which any particular penny,
once spent, cannot be spent again.
Now, within this budget, as in any other, there are allocative choices to
be made. If I spend most of the available complexity showing parks and
schools, there will not be much left for depicting the alternative street
routes that can take me to my destination. So among the details of which
the world is so rich, one must discern those details most important for the
purpose at hand,73 and in the austerity that is the elegance of abstraction,
select only the highest in priority from among these.74 The best abstrac-
tion, or even the better one, cannot be determined without reference to the
goals: Both the level of complexity and the allocation of it to detail depend
upon the abstraction's purpose. In order to judge the better map from the
70. Glenmary Research Center, Percent of Population Unchurched, By Counties of the United
States: 1971 (1974).
71. See supra p. 1599; pp. 3-4.
72. See, e.g., A. ROBINSON, R. SALE & J. MORRISON, supra note 67, at 201-16 (theories of
representation by point symbols in cartography); cf. M. BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOM-
ICS, OR How ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN 254-55 (1980) (simplifying assumptions made in conjunction
with development of growth theory result in this having "extremely limited practical implications").
73. See Klevorick, supra, note 5, at 244-45 (more formal models can "give insights about more
complicated settings in which the results of the more 'stripped down' models are relevant"); cf. Kel-
man, Misunderstanding Social Life: A Critique of the Core Premises of "Law and Economics," 33 J.
LEGAL EDuC. 274, 274-75 (in its attempt to organize realty, legal economics appears also relentless
in its attempt to "filter the complexity of both social life and individual identity").
74. This choice is not irreversible, but a rerun of the selection requires reconstructing the
framework.
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worse, a critic must know these goals-must even, for purposes of judging,
accept them-and carry on the criticism from there.
But then, to where? To the investigation of two sets of things: the
choice about the allocation of complexity, and the technical integrity with
which the abstracting process is carried out. The former I will turn to in a
moment; the latter I discuss briefly here. Good mapmaking means certain
things, and two mapmakers pursuing the same objectives with the same
information can nevertheless produce maps of differing quality. Similarly,
a single task in economic abstracting can be done better or more poorly as
a function of the economist's efforts, imagination, and skill. The integrity
of the abstraction is, I think, in part a matter of casting the problem in
such a way that the research can bring to bear the intellectual metaphors
of the field.
Differing senses of "like" are what distinguish one discipline from an-
other, one form of answer from another. 5 To my amazement in the first
few days of law school, I learned that water can be like cows. When is
water like cows? Answer: When it's escaping from land. 6 A lawyer might
be equally surprised to find that hay-bailing wire can be like San Fran-
cisco housing. When is this so? When both are in short supply due to
price controls." Within a discipline, the sense of like goes yet deeper:
Does the demand for potatoes fall when prices rise, as demand does for
many other products, or could its relationship to price be otherwise?78 Do
jobs for minority group members rise in a simple stairstep fashion as
neighborhoods come to be more integrated?79 Or do these jobs rise in
75. See Hansmann, The Current State of the Law-and-Economics Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 217, 221 n.12 (1983) (characterizing lawyerly thinking as entailing treating "like" things
alike); Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv.
591, 637-38 (1980) (discussing sense of analogy in economics and in law); Priest, Social Science
Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University, 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 437, 439 (1983)
(economics brings to the law different presuppositions and organizing thoughts). These systems of
analogy and classification distinguish one system of thought from another. Cf M. FOUCAULT, THE
ORDER OF THINGS XV (1966, trans. 1970) (quoting and discussing set of categories from a "'certain
Chinese encyclopaedia' in which it is written that 'animals' are divided into : (a) belonging to the
Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) in-
cluded in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair
brush, (i) et cetera, (in) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like
flies").
76. See Rylands v. Fletcher, [1866] 1 L.R. Ex. 265, af'd, [1868] 3 L.R.-E.&I. App. 330.
77. See J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLIcATIONS 40-41, 321-29 (2d ed. 1980) (dis-
cussing market effects of imposing price controls, and example of San Francisco housing). See gener-
ally GUIDELINES: INFORMAL CONTROLS AND THE MARKET PLACE (G. Schultz & R. Aliber eds.
1966) (collection of essays on consequences of various forms of price controls); Cheung, A Theory of
Price Control, 17 J.L. & ECON. 52 (1974) (price controls analyzed as limitations on contracting).
78. See J. HENDERSON & R. QuANDT, supra note 29, at 34 (although demand usually declines
as price rises, the reverse relationship is possible; goods for which this occurs are called Giffin goods);
Dwyer & Lindsay, Robert Gijfin and the Irish Potato, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 188, 191 (1984) (Giffin
goods are more likely to be found in poor communities that import most of their food).
79. See Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Emplo)yent, and Metropolitan Decentralization, 82
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number with some integration, taper off with more, and still after that
decline? 0 Clearly, there are important judgments to be made about the
way that those within a discipline go about constructing their abstractions,
even once the goals of the inquiry have been set. Assuming, however, that
the technical- integrity expectations have been met, satisfaction or dissatis-
faction with an abstraction most likely links in some way to its original
assumptions.
It is here that reasonable people must often agree to disagree. For the
assumptions acceptable to one abstracter or another can on occasion be as
varied as the persons from whom they derive. Not always, of course:
There are times when the findings of one episode of research become the
assumptions of yet another, so that the wheel need not be continually
reinvented. And at other times the assumptions based at first on intuition
can quickly be verified by a test.
But there are also times (most of the time, in my experience) when at
least one of the assumptions entailed in the abstraction relates to the ex-
pertise of another discipline,81 or to the ordinary knowledge that human
beings have,8 2 or possibly to both. When this is the case, evaluation of the
goodness of an abstraction becomes itself complex. For the choice about
one assumption, intertwined as it is with other such choices made within
the budget of complexity, may become of necessity a choice about the
package of assumptions all together. Nevertheless, if one focuses first on
these extra-disciplinary assumptions, progress in framing a judgment can
yet be made.
Q.J. ECON. 175 (1968).
80. See Offner & Saks, A Note on John Kain's Housing Segregation, Negro Employvnent, and
Metropolitan Decentralization, 85 Q.J. ECON. 147 (1971).
81. See, e.g., Akerlof & Dickens, supra note 7 (economic analysis of workplace safety, with as-
sumptions about cognitive dissonance made in light of previous psychology research); cf Tushnet,
Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALEc L.J. 1205, 1212 (1981) (problem of some economic
analysis of law is the use of unsupported abstraction).
82. See C. LIND3LOM & D. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE 8, 12 (1979) (defining ordinary
knowledge as "knowledge that does not owe its origin, testing, degree of verification, truth status, or
currency to distinctive [professional social inquiry] techniques but rather to common sense, casual
empiricism, or thoughtful speculation and analysis"); cf. Tushnet, supra note 81, at 1214 ("[I ]n tradi-
tional policy analysis, common sense is used both to select a goal and to determine how to achieve
it.").
Lindblom and Cohen point out:
The most basic knowledge we use in social problem solving is ordinary.
Everyone has ordinary knowledge-has it, uses it, offers it. It is not, however, a homogene-
ous commodity. Some ordinary knowledge, most people would say, is more reliable, more
probably true, than other. People differ from each other in the kind and quality of ordinary
knowledge they possess.
C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, supra, at 15 (footnote omitted). The line between ordinary knowledge
and scientific knowledge is not a hard and fast one, and indeed may depend upon the state of the
knowledge. For example, the most important way in which ordinary knowledge grows is by turning
into scientific knowledge. K. POPPER, THE LoGIc OF ScIENTIFrc DiscovERY 18-19 (1959). Cf C.
LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, supra, at 13 n.2 (some ordinary knowledge was once scientific knowledge).
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Here we consider, by assumption, assumptions about which the disci-
pline's "expert" offers no special expertise. The economist, for example, is
no more expert than other lay persons when the necessary assumptions
must include a specification of attitudes toward childbirth or a direction
from which the sun is believed to rise.8" When it comes to assumptions
such as these, the economist constructing an abstraction relies upon the
expertise of others, or upon ordinary experience. It is therefore possible
that a similarly situated economist, with identical skills and technical ex-
pertise, would nevertheless obtain results at odds with those of the first,
and not because of lack of technical integrity in the work: Assumptions
intimately affect outcomes, of course, and for some sets of contrasting out-
comes, assumptions will be the only source of difference.
What then should be the relationships between ordinary knowledge and
professional expertise, and between the world of the abstraction and the
world it seeks to reflect? How, then, should lawyers relate to the expertise
economists bring to bear?
A Word From Another Sponsor: Ordinary Knowledge and, the Process of
Abstraction
An economist thinks in terms of models and theories. But so does the
rest of the world. To grab hold of the thought style of economics must
mean, then, that one think not only in terms of models and theories, but
also in terms of such models and theories as economists employ. This
sense of "economicsiness" provides the commonality for binding these
thought patterns one to another, while distinguishing them from the
thought patterns of other kinds of inquiries and of ordinary experience.
Yet, apart from this peculiar economic flavor, the economist's mode of
abstraction is not all that different from the mapmaker's or from the
thinking entailed in ordinary experience.
I said above that everyone thinks in terms of models and theories, a
statement of dubious truthfulness. Unless, that is, one adopts a generously
energetic definition of the verb "thinks"-which I now do. Every day we
go about life on the basis of very powerful yet unarticulated theories,
about the world and how we relate to it. We believe in replication, for
example, in that we expect that if we do the same thing today as we did
yesterday-eating breakfast, catching a bus-things will turn out the
83. See C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, supra note 81 (professional social inquiry may have "no
distinct advantages in stock or use of ordinary knowledge helpful to public policy and many other
forms of social problem solving"); D. NORTH & R. MILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF PuBLIC IssuEs 8
(2d ed. 1973) (economist is not qualified "to answer the pivotal question of whether life begins at
conception, at 24 weeks, or at birth, [n]or. . . whether or not abortion should be legally permitted or
proscribed," but can analyze the economic aspects of the issues).
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same as they did before. We believe that if we go to sleep in one location
we will wake up the next day in the same spot, that flipping certain
switches makes a room lighter rather than colder, that drinking water
stifles thirst, and so on. None of these propositions need be true day after
day. But they usually are, and indeed the regularity is so striking that we
can forget the essential role of theory-here, a theory that the future will
be like the past-in even the most simple of daily tasks.
Sometimes this overarching theory, that the future will be like the past,
is incorrect. I expect the bridge to be where it has always been because it's
always been there, and then one day it is located below its usual spot,
having collapsed into the Mianus River. Or, having functioned on the
theory that my memory replicates reality, I fail to find the bridge because
I am myself in a different spot. And so it goes: We live by theories, by
assumptions of regularity, despite the fact that they fail us. We do this
because abstractions about the world are necessary to function in it; we
must see things in patterns if we are to deal with much information at all.
And these abstractions, although they fail us, are better than no abstrac-
tions at all. Like the infinite regress of attempting to define all words by
using other words, we cannot comprehend everything all at once, without
understanding some things first. And those first understandings, inarticul-
able except in terms of themselves, become the first two-by-fours in the
framework within which we build our thoughts. Then, when our theories
fail us, we can use that experience to revise the plan of the structure, so
that in the future our theories will fail us less.
All of this is what we human beings, not just economists, do every day,
and our learning from it constitutes "ordinary knowledge.""M It is the
wellspring from which we draw and to which we replenish knowledge as
we go about the continual processes of explanation and prediction, re-
explanation and, at times, simply wondering about the world in which we
live. This "ordinary knowledge," viewed as both a process of thinking and
a reservoir of its results, figures importantly in the development of "scien-
tific theories" such as those of economics.8 5 The reservoir services the
dally experiences that form the main estate of ordinary knowledge, and
also serves as a perception of reality against which scientific theories may
be tested.
This process of ordinary knowledge also serves the scientific inquiry by
84. C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, supra note 82, at 12; n.78; cf. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 10-20 (1977) (distinguishing "ordinary observer" and "scientific poli-
cymaker" based on "the existence of a divergent understanding of the nature of legal language").
85. K. POPPER, supra note 82, at 22 (scientific knowledge is result of growth of common sense
knowledge, and "[ilts very problems are enlargements of the problems of common-sense knowledge");
cf. id. at 47 (social scientists can draw on introspection as a source of knowledge about behavior, and
because of this, have an inherent advantage over those studying natural phenomena).
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providing a metaphor and a method. The continual testing of beliefs about
the real world, and their consequent reaffirmation or revision have their
counterparts in the scientific method."6 Just as ordinary knowledge calls
upon the imagination for its agenda of inquiry, so the paradigm-creating
"experts," schooled in the mainstream (but retiring) paradigms, had to
rely upon imaginations about ideas outside the profession's then-existing
expertise.8 7 g This is not to deny the significance of expertise or its indis-
pensable role in the growth of knowledge. Rather, it is to say that the
process by which knowledge grows within the realm of the expert is not
totally unlike that of its growth in the realm of ordinary experience.
Which is also to say, with respect to economic analysis about law, that
ordinary experience and other sources of expertise-particularly those of
persons not economists-may supply some needed imagination in the ab-
stracting work yet to be done.
And just as the ordinary experience and expertise of lawyers may bring
a special perspective to the construction of a framework, so it may prove
valuable in adoption of assumptions and the theory's real-world tests. To
explore this, I want to switch channels several times to observe some illus-
trative vignettes-doctor and lawyer shows, mostly-that will prove useful
for the discussion to follow.
Switching Channels I: (Mostly) A Medical Tale
In 1797 Benjamin Rush sued William Cobbett for libel. After hearing
a markedly pro-plaintiff charge, the jury retired briefly and then returned
to order an award of $5000.88 Despite this victory for Dr. Rush, or more
likely because of it, the practice of medicine has never been quite the
same.
Benjamin Rush was an eminent Revolutionary Era statesman: signer of
the Declaration of Independence, framer of the United States Constitution
and the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the first Treasurer of the Mint. 9
86. See M. BLAUG, supra note 72, at 15 ("In ordinary life, as in science itself, we acquire knowl-
edge and improve on it by a constant succesion of conjectures and refutations, using the familiar
method of trial and error.").
87. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF ScINrIFC REVOLUTIONS 90 (2d ed. 1970):
Almost always, [those] who achieve the fundamental inventions of a new paradigm have been
either very young or very new to the field whose paradigm they change. . . . [O]bviously these
are the men who, being little committed by prior practice to the traditional rules of normal
science, are particularly likely to see that those rules no longer define a playable game and to
conceive another set that can replace them.
Id.
88. Rush v. Cobbett, 2 Yeates 275, 275-76 (Penn. 1798) (Supreme Court sitting as trial court).
T. CARPENTER, A REPORT OF AN ACTION FOR A LIBEL, BROUGHT BY DR. BENJAMIN RUSH,
AGAINST WILLIAM COBBETT (report of trial to jury)(1800).
89. See Rosen, Benjamin Rush, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
588-89 (1968); Shryock, Benjamin Rush, in 8 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, PART II
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As a physician he was equally luminary, a fact of common knowledge to
scholars of history and medicine, and to Philadelphians." Educated at
Edinburgh, Dr. Rush founded the first medical society in America, then
helped to establish the first libraries and medical schools here. 1 Now re-
garded as "the father of American psychiatry," 2 he advocated the recog-
nition of insanity as a form of illness, and campaigned for humane treat-
ment of the mentally ill.93 He was an extraordinarily prolific and
perceptive writer;94 his treatise on psychiatry remained the standard work
in the field for almost a century.93
The ardor that characterized Rush's enterprise of psychiatry and polit-
ics he brought to other ventures as well. Dr. Rush was a creative theorist,
particularly in matters of health.9" Moreover, he carried his theories into
practice, quite literally. To put it in less delicate terms, Dr. Rush bled
people to death.9 According to Benjamin Rush, there exists only one dis-
ease among humankind; all the illnesses of body or limb are but various
manifestations of it.9 From this it follows, said Dr. Rush, that there is
but one proper treatment for illness, namely, bloodletting, on which each
specific therapy is but a variation.99 On this basis, Dr. Rush became the
most actively dedicated bloodletter of his day.100
Now, in spirit, this was hardly new. For twenty-one hundred years or
thereabouts bloodletting had been standard stuff in the medical armament
227-31 (1963).
90. See N. GOODMAN, BENJAMIN RUSH: PHYSICIAN AND CITIZEN 1746-1813 162 (1934); D.
HAWKE, BENJAMIN RUSH REVOLUTIONARY GADFLY ix (1971); Shryock, Benjamin Rush From the
Perspective of the 20th Century, in 14 TRANSACIONS AND STUDIES OF THE COLLEGE OF PHYSI-
CIANS OF PHILADELPHIA 114 (1946-47).
91. Shryock, supra note 89, at 229.
92. D. HAWKE, supra note 90, at ix.
93. N. GOODMAN, supra note 90, at 255.
94. See N. GOODMAN, supra note 90, at 382-90 (listing Rush's published writings).
95. See B. RUSH, MEDICAL INQUIRIES AND OBSERVATIONS UPON THE DIsEASES OF THE MIND,
(Philadelphia 1812, reprinted 1962); Lloyd, Benjamin Rush and His Critics, in 2 ANNALS OF MEDI-
CAL HISTORY 470, 471 (E. Packard ed. 1930); N. GOODMAN, supra note 90, at 259.
96. Ironically, one of Dr. Rush's theories, though mistaken in certain respects, could have ended
yellow fever had his proposals been taken seriously. Blaming the disease on "noxious miasma" from
marshes, he advocated draining them. But the politics of the day made controversial the notion of a
local origin for the disease and Rush's theory went unheeded. J. FLEXNER, DOCTORS ON HORSEBACK
105 (1944).
97. See C. BINGER, REVOLUTxoNARY DOCTOR: BENJAMIN RUSH, 1746-1813, 228-29 (Norton
ed. 1966). "[Tlruly, he shed more blood than any general in history." J. FLEXNER, supra note 96, at
113.
98. See C. BINGER, supra note 97, at 228 (summarizing Rush theory); G. CORNER, THE Atrro-
BIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN RUSH 363-66 (same); Shryock, supra note 89, at 229 (same); Shryock,
supra note 90, at 114 (same).
99. C. BINGER, supra note 97, at 228; Shryock, supra note 90, at 114.
100. N. GOODMAN, supra note 90, at 253; Pepper, Benjamin Rush's Theories on Bloodletting
After One Hundred and Fifty Years, 14 TRANSACTIONS & STUDIES OF THE COLLEGE OF PHYSI-
CIANS OF PHILADELPHIA 121, 121 (1946-47). See supra, note 97.
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against disease. 01 Sure, there had been debates about which techniques to
use for each kind of disease, and whether "venesection," as it was called,
was "contraindicated," as it is called.10 2 (It was, in certain seasons of the
year, like the vernal equinox, and in certain seasons of life, such as in-
fancy and old age-or at least in an earlier age it was so thought.103) And
it is true that Benjamin Rush participated in these run of the mill, which-
vein-to-let-for-what debates that had long been the lifeblood (forgive me)
of medical intellectual discourse.'"
But with Dr. Rush, the practice of bloodletting entered an entirely new
era. For, in contrast to his predecessors in the profession, from Hip-
pocrates to the medieval heretics, and from the purifiers of the Renais-
sance to the doctors of Rush's day,10 5 Dr. Rush did things properly:
Which is to say, Dr. Rush played by the rules. If the theory said, bleed
four-fifths of the blood out of someone, Dr. Rush was willing to do it.108
A kindly and compassionate physician, he offered his curative to rich and
poor alike, until finally he succeeded in raising the mortality rate of Phil-
adelphia.1 0 7 (This is not to say that his influence was limited to the ordi-
nary rich and poor of Philadelphia; his treatment was. given also to
George Washington, who died shortly thereafter.' 0 8) With Dr. Rush what
was different was simply that he really did it. In the past, bloodletting
hadn't really been done in a no-holds-barred allegiance to medical theory;
professional expertise had always been tempered, restrained, by common
sense'°-by the ordinary knowledge each of us has deep inside, by that
still, small voice that says, being bloodless can't be all that good for you.
Benjamin Rush was honest and loving. He believed in the correctness
101. See J. FLEXNER, supra note 96, at 102; J. SAUNDERS & C. O'MALLEY, ANDREAS VESALIUS
BREXELLENSiS: THE BLOODLE'TING OF 1539, 6, 7-10 (1948); Pepper, supra note 100, at 124.
102. See J. SAUNDERS & C. O'MALLEY, supra note 101, at 15-19; Pepper, supra note 100, at
124-25. See also DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 302 (26th ed. 1974) (defining
contraindication); Pepper, supra note 100, at 125 (anemia, which must always have resulted from
Rush's blooditting, is today accepted as distinct contraindication to bleeding).
103. See 2 L. THORNDIKE, A HISTORY OF MAGIC AND EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE 728, 855-57
(1923).
104. See Pernick, Politics, Parties, and Pestilence: Epidemic Yellow Fever in Philadelphia and
the Rise of the First Party Systen, in SICKNESS AND HEALTH IN AMERICA 246 (J. Leavitt & R.
Numbers eds. 1978); J. SAUNDERS & C. O'MALU.Y, supra note 101, at 13-19.
105. See J. SAUNDERS & C. O'MALLEY, supra note 101, at 7-10; Pepper, supra note 101, at
124-25.
106. B. RUSH, supra note 95, at 189-90; see e.g., C. BINGER, supra note 97, at 228-29; Pepper,
supra note 100, at 123.
107. 11 W. COBBETT, PORCUPINE'S WORKS 251, 267-71 (London 1801); S. MORISON, THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 290 (1965); Shryock, supra note 89, at 229-30.
108. C. BINGER, supra note 97, at 246; 12 W. COBBETT, PORCUPINE'S WORKS 20 (London
1801).
109. See Pepper, supra note 100, at 123; Cf. J. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT
AMERICAN CImES 12-13 (1961) (comparing theoretical city planning to training and practices of
bloodletting physicians, particularly in lack of common sense).
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and the healing power of what he did. On the correctness of the bloodlet-
ting paradigm, the medical profession agreed with him without dissent
(except perhaps for the private agony of admitting to oneself that to do as
I say is not to do as I do).110 And Dr. Rush might have gone on helping
people in this fashion until-well, to be sure, until there were fewer that
were ill . . . if it hadn't been for William Cobbett.
William Cobbett, better known as Peter Porcupine, was no medical ex-
pert at all.11 ' The publisher and mainstay author of a Federalist paper,
The Porcupine's Gazette, he noticed that wherever Rush went, death
seemed to turn up, too." 2 Following his nose, which was following com-
mon sense, Mr. Cobbett assembled the grim statistics from Philadelphia,
figured out the correlation and published it in his newspaper. Cobbett's
statistical research was an epidemiological tour de force that would have
done a modern scholar proud.11 '
The medical establishment rushed (sorry) to defend its own; even ones
from competing schools of medicine-who had previously lost no time in
attacking Rush within the medical profession-now entered the fray on
the side of the doctor.'1 4 Keeping up with the daily newspaper exchanges
became a major spectator sport."' The more Dr. Rush's friends advised
him to ignore Cobbett's attacks, the more Rush became convinced that the
future of lifesaving medicine (and, perhaps incidentally, his honor) were
at stake."' Finally he filed his libel claim. He even won.
But instead of quenching the flames of controversy, the law suit served
to fuel them. Cobbett, having been forced to shut down his Porcupine's
Gazette,1 7 now opened a new paper, The Rush-Light, devoted exclusively
110. See Pernick, supra note 104 (divergence in belief as to when bloodletting was the therapy of
choice became particularly pronounced during the yellow fever epidemic of the 1790's); cf J. SAtN-
DERS & C. O'MALLEY, supra note 100, at 44-48 (sixteenth century physician dissents privately from
mainstream theories).
111. M. CLARK, PETER PORCUPINE IN AMERICA: THE CAREER OF WILLIAM COBBETr 1792-
1800, 72 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania 1939) (Cobbett was political writer and
journalist); Reitzel, William Cobbelt and Philadelphia Journalism: 1794-1800, 59 PA. MAG. HIST.
& BIOGRAPHY 223, 228-29 (1935).
112. See 11 W. COBBT, supra note 107, at 229-30; N. GOODMAN, supra note 90, at 216; see
also Reitzel, supra note 111, at 236; 1 G. SPATER, WILLIAM COBBETr, THE POOR MAN'S FRIEND
106 (1982).
113. See C. BINGER, supra note 97, at 247; Butterfield, Appendix IlI: The Cobbet-Rush Feud in
2 B. RUSH, LETERs OF BENJAMIN RUSH 1793-1813, at 1213, 1217; 1 G. SPATER, supra note 112,
at 106.
114. C. BINGER, supra note 97, at 243.
115. 2 B. RUSH, supra note 113, at 1213-18; 1 G. SPATER, supra note 112, at 80.
116. C. BINGER, supra note 97, at 241-42; M. CLARK, supra note 111, at 147; 1 G. SPATER,
supra note 112, at 101.
117. Judge Shippen's charge to the jury made clear that issues of libel had nothing to do with the
First Amendment. T. CARPENTER, supra note 88. See also M. CLARK, supra note 111, at 168; N.
GOODMAN, supra note 90, at 220.
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to Dr. Rush.11 Cobbett could not get enough copies of each issue printed
to meet the demand: Twenty-five hundred and then three thousand copies
sold out immediately each time, and tattered copies passed from hand to
hand. '19 Thomas Jefferson, a Rush patient and friend was appalled by
some of the Porcupine Tales. 2 ' Other political figures cheered from the
sidelines as the battle over the dominant medical therapy of the age was
fought out in this curious intertwining of Federalist with Republican po-
litical rhetoric. 2 The Porcupine's sharp quills brought in $10,000; Peter
himself set sail for England, whence he had years before come.122
Dr. Rush made some half-hearted and wholly vain attempts to revive
his dying practice, but no phoenix gave flight.1 28 He abandoned his earlier
dream of starting anew in New York City, for Cobbett had preempted
that hope with a special edition targeted at the New York market.124
Rush returned to his scholarly writing, lived quietly the remainder of his
days, and died with far less fanfare than did the theory he had catapulted
into the public debate.128
Bloodletting is not the cure for all ailments, as Rush had contended it is
(though it is, even today, a treatment for some). 28 It could survive with-
out substantial threat only so long as common sense kept expertise in
check. One doctor could disagree with another over theory or technique,
and yet the paradigm remain intact. But the intellectual framework
proved fragile: Bloodletting as a whole (apart from dissension in the
ranks) could succeed only as long as no one really did it. And when some-
one finally carried out the theory-and, in effect, for the first time, put it
to the test-with compassion for human suffering but without passion for
common sense, the theory failed. In the final analysis, ordinary knowledge
proved indispensable, first to the extraordinary survival of an unfittest
paradigm, and then to the ordinary survival of a people that had suc-
cumbed to it.127
118. Butterfield, supra note 113, at 1216. See also 11 W. CoBBE=T, supra note 107 (reprint of
selections from The Rush Light issues).
119. See B. RUSH, TRAVELS THROUGH LIFE, reprinted in G. CORNER, supra note 98, at
103-04; Butterfield, supra note 113, at 1217.
120. L. WrrHEY, DEAREST FRIEND: A LIFE OF ABIGAIL ADAMS 304 (1981); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Lewis, Jr. (May 9, 1798), reprinted in 4 T. JEFFERSON, THE WRrINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 240-41 (H. Washington ed. 1861); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel
Smith (Aug. 22, 1798), reprinted in 4 T. JEFFERSON, supra, at 253-56.
121. M. CLARK, supra note 111, at 153-57; Pernick, supra note 104, at 247.
122. Butterfield, supra note 113, at 1217; Reitzel, supra note 111, at 244.
123. J. FLEXNER, supra note 96, at 107, 113; N. GOODMAN, supra note 89, at 222.
124. M. CLARK, supra note 111, at 162.
125. Butterfield, supra note 113, at 1215, 1218; B. RUSH, supra note 119, at 101-02.
126. Pepper, supra note 100, at 125.
127. Cf. T. KUHN, supra note 87, at 84-85 ("The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new
one. . . is a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of
the field's most elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of its paradigm methods and
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Switching Channels II: (Mostly) A Legal Tale
If infants and the elderly caused bloodletting physicians to give pause,
they engendered even greater hesitation when it came to imposing the re-
quirements for trial by battle.128 Now in principle, there need have been
no conflict between the theory of the battle trial and the ability or agility
problems of particular combatants. For "the event of . . .private com-
bats, is directed by the judgment of God; and his providence awards the
victory to the juster cause,"129 declared a king of Burgundy who made this
trial the law. Surely God could so favor those handicapped in age or phys-
ical infirmity, if He would otherwise support the righteous that weren't in
tip-top physical shape. Indeed, if anything could serve both to establish
legal innocence and to spark religious awe, it would seem to be a blind
but righteous party coming to prevail over sighted guilt.
The law responded, however, by exempting some individuals from bat-
tle, or sometimes permitting hired champions in their stead."' Whether
this reflected a distrust of God's attentions, or humility's reluctance to de-
mand more of Him than compulsory attendance, it is difficult to say.13 1
But the chasm between the theory and belief about the real world had
been, for the time at least, bridged by a sort of band-aid, and the battle
trial went on.
And it is true that trial by battle, even if it posed some theoretical and
practical problems, had also offered some theoretical and practical solu-
tions. To the innocent party apprehensive of the ordeal, (or, for that mat-
ter, to any others) the option of battle provided an alternative mode of
trial.1 2 Moreover, as "an antidote to perjury,"' ' then lamentably wide-
applications.").
128. 3 E. GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 590 (2d
ed. 1781) (the old and infirm had either to renounce their claims and possessions or "trust the doubt-
ful aid of a mercenary" to protect their interests).
129. THE BURGUNDIAN CODE § 45, at 52 (K. Drew trans. 1949). Trial by battle was reestab-
lished by King Gundobad of Burgundy in May 502, by edict published at Lyons in response to
problems occasioned by perjury. G. NEILSON, TRIAL BY COMBAT 5-6 (1890). Trial by battle was
introduced into England in 1066 by William the Conqueror. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 39 (2d ed. 1898, reissued 1968).
130. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 338-39 (Clarendon ed.
1768) (permitting champions in actions regarding property in order to prevent death of either party; if
either party were killed, judgment could not be awarded); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 309 (7th ed. rev. 1956); Charter of Henry I issued between 1100 and 1129, reprinted
in THE HISTORICAL CHARTERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE CITY OF LONDON 3
(W. Burch ed. London: 1884) (exempting London residents from trial by battle).
131. See Baldwin, The Intellectual Preparation for the Canon of 1215 Against Ordeals, 36
SPECULUM 613, 628 (1961) (noting that clergy opposed trial by ordeal and trial by combat on a
number of grounds, including belief that one should not tempt God, and idea that such trials de-
manded constant miracles, in contrast to Biblical notion of miracles as privileges for a chosen few
rather than the right of the general population); cf. Fourth Lateran Council, Canon 18, Innocent III
(1215 A.D.) (barring participation of clergy in ordeals).
132. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at 338 (permitted where witnesses had died or where
1610
Vol. 93: 1587, 1984
Law and Economics
spread, it supplanted at times several systems of oaths that both common-
ers and kings found wanting."' Clearly, parties required to defend their
mouths with their bodies, and witnesses that might be called upon to be
truthful to the death had an incentive to be careful about the glades and
valleys into which their mouths might lead them.15
But there came to be concern that errors fell on the side of truthful
statements not being offered, for witnesses in particular (and nonathletes
in general) exhibited understandable misgivings about the vigor with
which they should assert their views."8 And the converse fear also
haunted: Was it probable, or even conceivable, that a losing but
ablebodied party could nevertheless be right?13 7
The spirit of such wonderings pervaded the spirit of the laws 3 8 and
once again, adjustments to the perception of reality were made.13 9 The set
of persons obliged to fight was further limited, and the rules for hiring
champions were eased; indeed not only was it "wise to supplement an
honest cause with a stout champion," 40 but for many types of actions, it
came to be required. 41 Churches and other institutions kept champions
on retainer; and even courts had battlers prepared to maintain the accu-
racy of a record that might come into question.142 Championship became
a regular occupation, and indeed a common surname." 3 Jurisdiction over
defect existed in the evidence); 2 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS Ill (1949) (trial by
battle was sometimes permitted because of dearth of witnesses for either party); 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 600 (2d ed. 1898, reissued 1968) (appropriate when
defendant could not raise enough "oath helpers" to swear to his innocence).
133. G. NEILSON, supra note 128, at 6.
134. THE BURGUNDIAN CODE, supra note 128, § 45, at 52; 3 E. GIBBON, supra note 129, at 589(trial by ordeal was also believed rife with fraud); G. NEILSON, supra note 128, at 4-7.
135. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 130, at 308 (witnesses could be called on to do battle to
prove their veracity); G. NELSON, supra note 128, at 6 (King Gundobald specifically introduced trial
by battle so that one's body as well as soul would be at risk).
136. Cf. G. NEILSON, supra note 128, at 42-43 (instead of pursuing private prosecution, "[it] was
natureal that men should shrink from the thankless and dangerous office").
137. 3 E. GIBBON, supra note 129, at 590 (noting that law yielded to the strong, not the just); G.
NEILSON, supra note 128, at 47, 50 (use of champions developed into fighting by "judicial
prizefighters" who could be bribed into abandoning their cause). Cf. G. NEILSON, supra, at 40
("[Aifter confessing to the king that he had no right to certain lands, [a man] had the effrontary to
wage battle for them-and was then fined.").
138. 2 C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 132, at 110-11; see also G. NEILSON, supra note 128, at
33, 64 (examples of how trial by battle became more limited in effect).
139. Cf T. KUHN, supra note 87, at 78 (defenders of epistomological theories "will devise numer-
ous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent
conflict").
140. G. NEILSON, supra note 128, at 51-52.
141. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at 337-39 (such trials were required in court martials,
in appeals of felony and for civil cases involving writs of right); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 130,
at 308 (trials by battle were used in international controversies in addition to criminal cases and suits
involving repayment of debt or reclaiming of land).
142. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 130, at 309; G. NEILSON, supra note 128, at 50.
143. G. NEILSON, supra note 128, at 69.
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such trials was enthusiastically sought by churches and nobles for the in-
come and perquisites it conferred.""'
On the whole, the law accommodated all of this admirably, but it was
not enough. The battle against battle trials entered a new phase: The
causes for which there was battle trial were diminished in number, and a
new mode of decision, trial by assize, was allowed. 1" Details of battle
procedure abounded; but the details introduced to lend battle acceptability
came also to make it complex, until cost and tedious technicalities joined
danger as causes for its dread. 46
Throughout all this stretching across the chasm, the theory itself stayed
intact. It came simply to apply to so limited a field of reality that it could
in such safety survive. Rather than adapt the theory to its world, the law
chose to circumscribe it, and the successive contractions of its sphere of
applicability constituted its effective demise. 47 Thus the battle trial left
space for a new theory, one that could, for the first time by oaths plus
reason, span the chasm with an honest-to-goodness bridge.148 In large part
because of dissatisfaction with the battle (and the other God-dependent
judgments its system had joined), 49 the new mode of trial, the assize,
could blossom with theoretical richness1 50 and become the dominant mode
of trial.
144. Id. at 13-15.
145. Id. at 33. Remarkably, for a short time before the advent of trial by assize, following the
withdrawal of the Church from the conduct of the ordeals, judges were instructed in 1219 that for
certain causes of action they could conduct no trials at all. Various makeshift arrangements were made
for existing or imprisoning the most serious possible offenders, and taking bonds for others. See S.
MILsoM, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 358-61 (1969).
146. W. FoRsyTH, TRIAL BY JURY 125 n.1 (London 1852); R. GLANVILLE, A Treatise on the
Laws and Customs of England 45-46 (1189) (J. Beams trans 1900).
147. See G. NEILsoN, supra note 128, at 64-65 (exemption granted to Londoners was rapidly
followed by exemptions for other burghs); I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 132, at 224
(English law was rapidly confining judicial combat within very narrow limits); cf. T. KUHN, supra
note 86, at 77 ("[W]hen confronted by even severe and prolonged anomalies [scientists] may begin to
lose faith and then to consider alternatives, [but they never] renounce the paradigm that has led them
into crisis.").
148. G. NEILSON, supra note 128, at 33-35; cf. T. KUHN, supra note 87, at 52 ("[Flundamental
novelties of fact and theory . . . [piroduced inadvertently by a game played under one set of rules
[require for their assimilation] the elaboration of another set. After they have become parts of science,
the enterprise, at least of those specialists in whose particular field the novelties lie, is never quite the
same again.").
149. See I W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 130, at 299-312 (discussing older modes of trial and
their drawbacks); id. at 321-27 (development of criminal procedure and its related modes of trial); id.
at 113-19 (older modes of trial in civil disputes); T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 113-19 (5th ed. 1956) (ordeals, wager of law, and battle).
150. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 130, at 312-21, 327-30 (development of assize and jury
trial); 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 130-33 (1926) (development of law of
evidence and principles of reasoning that paralleled growth of theory of jury trial); T. PLUcKNE-r,
supra note 149, at 106, 120-31 (development of trial by jury and rational approach to jury trial).
Trial by battle was officially abolished in England in 1819. 59 Geo. III, ch. 46 (1819).
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Switching Channels III: Yet Another Medical Tale
Although bloodletting drew upon professional expertise, still other
treatments were left to the ministrations of those with ordinary
knowledge. Popular knowledge of the eighteenth century, for example,
pointed repeatedly to one cure for the dreaded tarantula bite:' "[Taran-
tulas] are not venemous, but in hot Weather; at which Time, whoever is
bit by them after some Time loses both Sense and Motion, and dies if
destitute of Help. The most effectual Remedy is Music."'" And here, the
person of ordinary knowledge turned to a different kind of expert for
help.
The Musician tries a Variety of Airs, till he hits upon one, that
effects [sic] the Patient, who upon that begins to move by Degrees;
first keeps Time with his Fingers, Arms, and Legs, afterward is vio-
lently agitated in every Part of his Body; and then leaps up, begins
to dance, and increases in Activity every Moment; till after five or
six Hours, being very much fatigued, he is put to Bed and left to
sweat. The next Day the same Air brings him out of Bed for a new
Dance. Which Exercise being thus contained, the Distemper is
abated in the Space of four or five Days;. . .and the Patient begins
then to recover his Sense and Knowledge by little and little.15 3
The patience and skill of the musician could prove indispensable, for on-
the-job research was often needed for success.
As Music is the common Cure, so they who are bitten are pleased,
some with one sort of it, and some with another; one is pleased with
a Pipe, another with a Timbrel, one with a Harp, and another with
a Fiddle; so that the Musicians sometimes make several Essays
before they can accommodate their Art to the Venom: but this is
constant and certain, notwithstanding this Variety, that they all re-
quire the quickest and briskest Tunes; and are never moved by a
slow dull Harmony. 54
The occasional tarantula bite called forth crowds of concerned citizens,
and, miraculously, musicians arrived at the first call for help. 55 Indeed,
151. C. ENGEL, Music and Medicine, in 2 MUSICAL MYTHS AND FACTS 84, 100 (1876); 8
GRovE's DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 308 (E. Blom ed. 5th ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited
as GROVE'S]; Stockbridge, An Essay on the Nature and Properties of Sound, in W. BILLINGS, THE
NEw ENGLAND PSALM SINGER (1770), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM BILL-
INGS 11 (K. Kroeger ed. 1981).
152. Stockbridge, supra note 151, at 11 (emphasis in original).
153. Id. at 11-12.
154. Id. at 12.
155. Tabor, Wolf Spider: The Beast that Lent its Name to Dance, DANCE MAG., Jan. 1973, at
63, 63A (spider bites would increase as crowds gathered to watch; often observers would claim to be
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apparently intending to nip the bite in the bud, so to speak, musicians
were known to precede the tarantula in arrival at the scene: Particularly
where hungry tarantulas were likely to roam, hungry musicians roved the
vineyards, too, prepared to offer aggressive, as well as defensive, protec-
tion.156 A sort of forerunner Works Progress Administration, the tarantula
inspired composition and performance on a scale that has, perhaps, not
been witnessed since. Whole towns were first debilitated and then cured
in an epidemic of tarantula bites and dancing that swept across Eu-
rope-and then, at least in reputation, across the ocean to New
England.15
Now the theory that music was the cure for a tarantula bite could be
difficult to falsify, particularly in its time. For the rigor with which
crowds conscripted musicians-not to mention the vigor with which the
musicians volunteered themselves-assured that no man, at least no bitten
man, was an island. That did not, however, deter inquiry by the scientists
of the day: An ostensibly poisonous spider was shipped from Apulia, Italy
to Naples, in order to bite a rabbit under laboratory conditions; but only
the spider, and not the rabbit, danced, even to the full panoply of tunes.?15
Then scientific inquiry bent when it should not have done so: Conclud-
ing the inadequacy of his test, its author offered in its stead a scientific
theory in support of the cure. This physician, and others of his time, ac-
quiesced in what seemed, at first, to be amazing if it were true.15 9 Thus,
attempts at scientific rebuttal were followed at times by expertise's surren-
der-surrender to a different vision of the facts before one's eyes or sur-
render concerning the viability of the scientific medical response. 160
Perhaps because of the tarantella and the bloodletting that followed-or
perhaps because the venom isn't poisonous-everyone seemed to get
well. 61 There existed some doubts about the cure, to be sure, even in its
high days; indeed, there existed doubts about the purported dangers of the
disease. 62 But the cure, and perhaps even the disease, fulfilled a need-a
bitten and join the dance).
156. P. SCHOLES, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO MUSIC 1011 (9th ed. 1955); Tabor, supra note
155, at 63A.
157. See, e.g.,Stockbridge, supra note 151, at 11; Tabor, supra note 155, at 63A.
158. Sigerist, The Story of Tarantismn, in Music AND MEDICINE 96, 109 (D. Schullian & M.
Schoen eds. 1948); Tabor, supra note 155, at 63A.
159. Sigerist, supra note 158, at 110-11; Tabor, supra note 155, at 63A. Interestingly, Charles
Stockbridge, see supra note 151, was himself a physician. See Charles Stockbridge, in C. SHim'ON,
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THOSE WHO ATTENDED HARVARD COLLEGE 492-93 (1965).
160. See Sigerist, supra note 158, at 110-11; Tabor, supra note 155, at 63A; cf. Asch, Effects of
Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgment, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND
MEN 177-90 (H. Guetzkow ed. 1951) (social and personal conditions induce individuals to resist or
yield to group pressures even when the latter are perceived to be contrary to fact).
161. P. SCHOLES, supra note 156, at 1011.
162. C. ENGEL, supra note 151, at 100; Tabor, supra note 155, at 63A.
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need for expressing melancholy, or providing misery with its desired com-
pany. . or simply a need to dance."1 3 And so, while scientific knowledge
of the day was thus stumped or stunted, ordinary knowledge, such as it
was, held sway.
Returning to the Sponsor
What, then, to make of professional expertise, which can be right but
can also be wrong? When The Economist meets up with The Law, what
is either of them to do? To ask these questions is to ask how-in what
ways-can we come to know, and how in particular can we come to know
about law? To this question The Economist brings not the answer, but
one answer, one way of confronting the complexity of the world.
Economics is always the economics of something-or-other, and hence
the assumptions, even the most critical of them, are assumptions about
something else, in this case, about the law. So the lawyer's expertise com-
plements that of the economist, and the other way 'round.' 6" Economists
bring to such assumptions a sense of structure for the abstraction-a sense
of what is tractable and what is not-but beyond that sense, indeed,
before it can be brought into play, they must learn about the law. And
while such knowledge is to an economist a matter of ordinary knowledge,
if it is known at all, it is within the lawyer's realm of expertise."6 5
Moreover, when it comes to deciding where to spend the complexity
pennies, the economist has in mind some structure, but the ensuing deci-
sions entail legal expertise: Which aspects of the law of nuisance best
characterize it, if but one or two or three can be taken into account? What
are the hallmarks of the criminal law, and does a given economic abstrac-
tion handle them in an appropriate way? 1 6
Decisions about such things are matters of judgment,16 7 and so are eval-
163. Sigerist, supra note 158, at 113-14 (suggesting that the disease was kind of neurosis caused
by Church's repression of need to dance); Tabor, supra note 155, at 64A (suggesting tarantella was
caused by mass hysteria or need to rebel against Church's prohibition of dancing); cf. C. ENGEL,
supra note 151, at 102-03 (discussing Abyssinian equivalent of tarantism, the tigretiya, stating that
disease was simply depression, for which music and dance provide effective cure).
164. See THE EcONOMic APPROACH TO LAW, supra note 6, at 26 (because of complementary
nature of law and economics "collaboration between lawyers and economists will be increasingly fruit-
ful in the future").
165. See Hansmann, supra note 5, at 225 (development of economics scholarship is directly pro-
portional to the amount of judge-made law in respective subfields of law); but Sf. Klevorick, supra
note 5, at 241-42 (examining, and excepting from, Hansmann theory).
166. As Kelman has noted:
One of the reasons the "economics of crime" literature seems so Martian to most criminal law
professors is that imprisonment is seen simply as an in-kind substitute for fines, and the level
of punishment is seen as reflecting the cost of violations. . . . The moral separation of crime
and tort is simply wiped out.
Kelman, supra note 73, at 275 n.6.
167. See Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HorsTRA L. Ray.
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uations of the abstraction itself.16 If the challenge of economic thinking is
indeed the proper use of abstraction,6" then a judgment about the ab-
straction entails not only an understanding about how the abstracting is
done, but also of the world to which it relates. The economist that knows
something about the law and the lawyer that knows something about the
thought styles of economics will be well able to make such judgments.
But to assign to each a sphere of ordinary and professional expertise is
not to say quite enough, for the lawyer and the economist each also stand
to gain from the ordinary knowledge that the other can bring to bear. The
venerable battle trial, after all, came to reflect these ordinary thoughts.
And had it not been for Peter Porcupine, a dangerous medical treatment
might have continued yet longer. Ordinary knowledge, as its own style of
thinking and as a reservoir of its results, may serve as a basis for specula-
tive invention, as an inspiration for future thought."'
The interplay of these forms of knowledge is essential, for the style of
abstraction in part determines the inquiry's results.17' And the latter im-
plies, to my thinking, not only that a newcomer adjusts for the assump-
tions-like sliding forward the seat in somebody else's car-but also that
one recalls in the end where they came from, that one remembers that
they are not always real. Abstraction is a means of seeing something that
was not visible before. But economic abstractions are not the world itself;
I cannot fully believe in them any more than I can expect to take a hike
along a map. They are useful fancies, often essential fancies, but fancies
nonetheless. "It does require maturity to realize that models are to be used
but not to be believed," cautioned an eminent econometrician. 172 When an
553, 561 (1980) ("lawyer-economist should be hightly skeptical of the empirical assumptions on
which he or she has based his or her analysis" when conflict exists with conception of justice).
168. See Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Common Law, 8
HoFsTRA L. REV. 591, 624-25 (1980) ("As logic transmits truth from premises to conclusions, one
might reasonably favor the model that captures important aspects of the world more accurately in its
assumptions.").
169. See supra pp. 1598-1600.
170. See N. HANSON, PATrERNS OF DiscovERY 4-19 (1958) (seeing is "theory-laden" but dif-
ferences in seeing and in interpretation of what is seen do not necessarily reflect differences in techni-
cal training, although they may do so); C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, supra note 81, at 15:
Despite the professional development of specialized investigative techniques, especially quanti-
tative, most practitioners of professional social inquiry, including the most distinguished among
them, inevitably rely heavily on the same ordinary techniques of speculation, definition, con-
ceptualization, hypothesis formulation, and verification as are practiced by persons who are not
social scientists or professional investigators of any kind.
See supra pp. 1590, 1604.
171. See pp. 1-5, 105; W. HIRSCH, supra note 23, at xiii (most of essential assumptions underly-
ing microeconomic theory are not met in real life"); cf. M. Friedman, Essay on the Methodology of
Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN PosrrIvE ECONOMICS 3, 14 (1953) (assumptions of theory need not
be realistic).
172. H. THEIL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMETRICS vi (1971); cf THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 381
(trans. J. Davies & D. Vaughan 1900) ("painting, or to speak generally, the whole art of imitation, is
busy about a work which is far removed from truth"); Stigler, What Does an Economist Know? 33 J.
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abstraction is wrong, when it's deceptively different from the world, it is
the abstraction that must be changed and not the subject of its
endeavor. 1
73
But as Professor Polinsky has effectively told us, it is the thought that
counts. One need not agree with every economist about everything, or in-
deed agree with any about much. The theories and the numbers econo-
mists offer should constitute a beginning of conversation, rather than its
end. As one person that engages in abstracting, I might not model things
as another person does. Professor Polinsky, for example, chooses not to
focus on the equity-efficiency relationship, and spends his complexity pen-
nies on analyzing risk attitude instead. 7 4 But the difference between us is
just a caveat I may attach to his results in my mind . . . and indeed, he
may do the same for mine. So long as I can understand the goals of his
inquiry (or anyone else's) I can discern where I dissent from the substan-
tive assumptions or where I would allocate complexity differently. And so
long as the abstraction has technical integrity, I can follow it to the end.
Not an end I agree with, necessarily, but nevertheless an end. It is the
thought that counts, and in that thought we can agree to meet.
A Final Act
Economists bring to any scene that they enter some powerful analytical
tools. Their sense of "like" and the metaphors that exploit it allow one to
see things not visible before. With it we can learn not only why hay-wire
is like housing or bridges like theatres, but also why prosecution can be
like investing 17 and why some accidents but not others occur."' If we
think law can make a difference-or if we want to know whether it
does-we need to know these things.177
LEGAL EDuc. 311, 312 (1983) ("[A]ll such deductions and inferences are exercises in economic logic
or terminology, not valid economic analyses of the working of real markets.").
173. Cf Bauer & Walters, The State of Economics, 18 J.L. & ECON. 1, 23 (1975) ("failure to
recognise the limitations both of [economics] as a whole and of some of its methods, neglect of direct
observation [and] a lack of reflection. . . have all contributed to the confused and perplexing state of
economics").
174. See, e.g., pp. 58-63 (reconsidering remedies for breach of contract in terms of risk prefer-
ences of parties and allocation of risks between parties).
175. See Forst & Brosi, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Prosecutor, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 177, 180-84 (1977).
176. See R. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 119-61 (2d ed. 1977) (analysis of the inci-
dence of accidents and the role of care in preventing them); Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J.
656 (1975); Chelius, Liability for Industrial Accidents: A Comparison of Negligence and Strict Lia-
bility Systems, 5 J. LEGAL STuD. 293 (1976); Diamond, Single-Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
107 (1974).
177. See Kitch, The Intellectual Foundations of "Law and Economics," 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 184,
184-85 (1983) (contribution of economics and law scholarship should be judged by the answers it
gives); Leff, supra note 6, at 459-62 (contribution of analyses such as that of Posner in Economic
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Yet, to employ these metaphors, these forms of abstraction, wisely is to
force oneself to make choices, whether one focuses on them or not. For
entailed in the decisions about assumptions and the complexity budget is
also the decision about how much complexity one believes appropriate to
the task, and that decision itself entails a balancing of the virtues of com-
plexity against the virtues of its avoidance.
Sometimes the abstractions can be simple ones that yet capture the es-
sence of their world. At other times, however, more complexity is neces-
sary if one wants to come to know; to avoid complexity then can be to
enlist with the cause of ignorance, or even to know that which is not
true.178 If one fails to consider a factor that truly relates, or if one shies
away from the more complicated form that would better depict the rele-
vant relationship, the resulting findings are suspect, and one cannot know
they are right.179
An example depicts one way that this can be: In a world where the
"best" outcome isn't available, is the closest thing to "best" the thing for
which one should strive? Sometimes yes: If you promise me a million dol-
lars, and then can give me only $900,000, I will take it; for having almost
a million dollars is almost as good as having a million. But sometimes
"almosts" of this sort are not almost as good: If I am flying to Hawaii and
the airplane almost makes it, I am really out of luck. The theory of the
second best 80 says this reaction is understandable: When the optimal out-
come can't be achieved, the second best one may be quite different from
the best. This answer is not a very satisfying one if the object is a yes or
no result; it offers instead a sophisticated form of agnosticism . . . a state-
ment that, in order to know the right answer, one will have to inquire
some more. And if one declines to go further, if one declines the additional
Analysis of Law is in pointing out that decisions favoring one party or another are not cost free to
those parties, to others in classes to which each belonds, or to persons besides those parties and
groups); Scott, Answers Are Needed More Than Perspectives, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 285, 285 (1983)
(dissenting from notion that the important contribution of economic analysis is not to give answers to
legal questions but, more modestly, to provide a different perspective); see, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX (1978) (discussing differing conceptions of proper role of antiturst law and their
implications for legislation, enforcement activity, and judicial decisionmaking; Macaulay, Law and the
Behavioral Sciences: Is There any "There" There?, 6 L. & PoL'Y Q. 149 (1984) (review of accom-
plishments of law and social science).
178. See Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 641, 641 (1980) (liability rule that
is efficient as between two potential litigant-classes can be inefficient once third-party or spillover
effects are taken into account).
179. See J. KMENTA, ELEMENTs OF ECONOMETRICS 392-95 (1971) (if relevant explanatory vari-
able is omitted, estimates of least squares regression coefficients may be biased and inconsistent); id. at
399-400 (estimation of nonlinear relationshiop by only a linear functional form is special case of
omission of relevant explanatory variable and therefore may yield biased and inconsistent results).
180. See Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11
(1957-1957).
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complexity, she confronts the prospect of "knowing" something that is
wrong.
And yet complexity, too, may pose problems; the blackened page that
began as a sparsely informative map testifies to that.181 Ockham's Razor
would cut away all that can be done without."i 2 Although abstractions
more complex can be more like the world, they can, for exactly that rea-
son, tell us less.
Indeed, the problem of the complexity-level decision is precisely this
difficult choice: How to judge when more or less complexity is worth its
cost? 8 3 And then, beyond that question, how to know once the complexity
and assumption choices have been made, whether one's abstraction, in
some sense at least, is right?
Empirical testing can lead us toward answers of sorts. One sort is sim-
ply comparison: Once a theory is cast in sufficiently specific form,'" we
can appraise it by comparing it to our experience in the world. 8 5 More-
over, although we may engage in empirical research in order to test the
theory, we may gain insights of other sorts as well. 1 6 From successive
empirical tests we may learn what will, in the future, give us theories that
are better still.
But the proper form and significance of empirical tests do not meet
with universal accord.18 7 Even if one assumes that results are unambigu-
ous, there is interpretive work yet to be done. When one finds from these
test that the theory comports with the world, one can say only that the
181. See supra p. 1600.
182. See Carre, William of Ockham, in M. CARRE, REALISTS AND NOMINALISTS 101, 107
(1946). But cf M. BLAUG, supra note 72, at 25 (simplicity of Newton's gravitation theory was not
apparent to his contemporaries).
183. Even William of Ockham was willing to entertain complexity in his theories when he found
it to be of advantage. See M. CARRE, supra note 182, at 108 (in fourteenth century realist-nominalist
controversy, Ockham argued that there is no single identical and simple entity which is present in
each of a number of particular things at the same moment).
184. Cf. Kornhauser, supra note 172, at 633-34 (efficiency notion employed in some descriptive
law and economics theories is insufficiently precise to afford meaningful empirical testing); Lindblom,
The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 79, 80, 87 (1959) (in contrast to incre-
mental approach of ordinary policy decisionmaking, academic problem-solving approach relies on the-
ory that typically is "insufficiently precise for application to a policy process that moves through small
changes").
185. See Klevorick, supra note 5, at 245 (need for empirical work in law and economics is clear,
but supply is lacking); Kornhouser, supra note 172, at 610-34, 636-37 (reviewing role, importance,
and contributions of research addressing descriptive claim of efficiency of law).
186. We may learn the magnitudes of particular effects at issue in the theory. See, e.g., J.
KMENTA, supra note 179, at 205-16 (presenting three methods for estimating regression parameters).
Indeed, the fact of doing the test may keep the theory in closer touch with reality. See Hansmann,
supra note 168, at 231.
187. See M. BLAUG, supra note 72, at 10-28, 94-128; id. at 26 ("what we cannot do is to
pretend that there is on deposit somewhere a perfectly objective method, that is, an intersubjectively
demonstrative method, that will positively compel agreement on what are or are not acceptable scien-
tific theories").
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theory is consistent with it (or the other way 'round). Before we can say
that the theory is correct, we must find a justification for induction, a task
not yet successfully done."' 8 Indeed, since theories can never be proven,
and only possibly contradicted, 8 9 we can hope to know a theory's truth
value only when the theory appears to be wrong. And even to know this
much, we must place crucial reliance on the form and manner of testing.
Moreover, it is always possible to point to sources of unreliability for
these results and to assert that discrepancies "will disappear with the ad-
vance of our understanding" 190-and such caveats do often foretell what is
to come. We can create definitions and methodologies, so that we some-
times assign the term of "knowing," ' but apart from knowing this la-
bel-apart from attaching it, or reading it-we do not necessarily know
more.
Were we to follow a falsificationist course, we would reject the theories
whose empirical tests fail. But if so, we would do both too much and too
little. Our "true" theories would be but those that have not yet been falsi-
fied, 92 and our false ones would be abandoned rather than tried again.
"If any and every failure. . . were ground for theory rejection, all theo-
ries ought to be rejected at all times,"'193 surely an unsatisfactory state.
So, we continue to use empirical knowledge for inference, to reason
from what we have seen to what has heretofore been unknown. We do
this even though induction is not necessarily "true,"19' and indeed it can
188. See M. BLAUG, supra note 72, at 11-17; J. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 233-77
(1921, reprinted 1963) (explaining induction and seeking justification for it). Cf. B. RUSSELL, PHI-
LOSOPHY 80, 83 (1927) ("Scientific induction is an attempt to regularize [the process of conditioned
reflexes or association] which we may call 'physiological induction' ").
189. See M. BLAUG, supra note 72, at 12-17.
190. K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 50 (1965).
191. This is indeed what Popper suggests, by means of defining scientific method. See id. at 55;
M. BLAUG, supra note 72, at 18-20 (discussing Popper's approach to scientific methodology).
192. Id. at 17.
193. T. KUHN, supra note 86, at 146. Indeed, had such rejections occurred at critical moments of
inquiry, theories worth pursuing might well have been abandoned. The discovery of Neptune illus-
trates some of these problems. Based on calculations about disturbances in the orbit of Uranus, John
Crouch Adams and Urbain Jean Joseph Leverrier, in independent researches, suggested the existence
of a planet in the place where Neptune was later found in 1846. See R. LYTrLErON, MYSTERIES OF
THE SOLAR SYSTEM 214-27 (1968). Hailed as a triumph of mathematical achievement and of astro-
nomical theory, id. at 227, the discovery was found to have entailed errors in the relevant calculations
which, inexplicably, did not foreclose success, id. at 228-29, 233; had the test of their theory occurred
instead in 1770, the relevant calculations would have been in error by about 30. Id. at 249. Predic-
tions of the same sort that led fortuitously to the discovery of Neptune pointed to the existence of yet
another planet, Vulcan, but that planet was never found; M. BLAUG, supra note 72, at 6. Despite this
empirical conflict with theory, the theory continued to be developed.
Ironically, it was the rejection of previous empirical research that made possible the "discovery" of
Neptune in 1846 rather than three-quarters of a century earlier, when Joseph Lalande reported its
discovery: Because his observation was at odds with his theory, Lalande believed his observation to be
erroneous. See M. GROSSER, THE DISCOVERY OF NEPTUNE 139 (1962); W. IVINS, ART & GEOME-
TRY: A STUDY IN SPACE INTUITIONS 54 n.4 (1946)
194. See supra note 188; Gardner, Order and Surprise, 27 PHIL. OF SCIENCE 109, 11-12 (1950);
1620
Law and Economics
be wrong. 95 Empirical research depends on our concept organization for
its validity,"" and on bothersome, unspoken assumptions. We assume, for
example, that we see what is before us. But we cannot satisfy even this
most essential of assumptions: For we censor and at times censure what
passes before our eyes, and this is true at the most basic level of percep-
tion. Whenever we see things, we are editing our vision by means of our
past experience.19 7 Moreover, even when we want to see all, we cannot do
so uniformly: Wholly apart from the editing function, we see with acuity
only a small slice of the world that happens to lie straight ahead; and
apart from even that problem, we see visual stimuli only some of the
time."9 "As we habitually elect for one or the other [image] so we make
assumptions on which we base our philosophies and our accounts of the
world."199
And so, we cannot truly know if theories are correct, or whether in-
stead they are false. Our ability to distinguish theories consistent or not
with the world depends on our methodology, which is itself a part of the
paradigm being tested. We cannot count even on our visual observation to
be fact. What then can we know, and how can we come to know it?
Indeed, how much about our world can we ever come to know?
What is amazing for all this, is that we can know, or at least under-
stand, some things. For reasons naught but fortuitous, there is order in the
universe, some of which we have discerned. "The most incomprehensible
thing about the world is that it is comprehensible;""2 0 and this is so de-
M. BLAuG, supra note 72, at 12-17.
195. Cf. D. MACAULAY, MOTEL OF THE MYsrERiEs 1-5, 21-25, 40 (1979) (explorer in year
4022 finds remains of Usa society as of its 1985 collapse; construing the motel to be a tomb, he infers
from the metal sculptures of animals that surround it-Cougars, Skylarks, Thunderbirds, all neatly
labeled--that animal worship figured importantly in Yank burial customs).
196. See J. PIAGET, BIOLOGY AND KNOWLEDGE 345 (1971) (the concepts by which we organize
our sense of the world are a sytem in state of perpetual adaptation).
197. See, e.g., Eye and Vision, Human, in 7 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITrANICA
MACROPAEDIA 91, 115 (15th ed. 1979):
In the extreme temporal fields (i.e., at the outside of the fields of vision), entirely different
objects are seen by the two eyes, and the selection of what is to dominate the awareness at any
moment depends largely on the interest it arouses. Where the fields overlap, and different
objects are seen by the two eyes . . . the final percept is determined by the need to make
something intelligible out of the combined fields.
Despite the fact that the retinal image of the external world is "essentially flat and two-dimensional,"
id. at 113, we can perceive depth and form, in contrast to which a camera sees a flat image. "We
recognize shapes of objects by experience, knowing that certain combinations of tones, light and shade
effects, indicate shapes of which we have tactile knowledge." J. SLoA, GIST OF ART 43 (1939). See
N. HANSON, supra note 174, at 6-8 ("People, not their eyes, see" and disparities among people in
what is seen arise from ex post interpretations, not from disparities in fundamental visual data).
198. See Eye and Vision, supra note 197, at 103 (threshold for vision is best expressed in terms of
frequency of seeing); id. at 104 (visual acuity is the power of the eye to resolve stimuli separated in
space); 7 THE FOUNDATIONS OF OPTHALMOLOGY 36, 368-70 (S. Duke-Elder ed. 1962) (discussing
visual acuity and its measure).
199. W. IVINS, supra note 193, at 6-7.
200. Gardner, Postscript in M. GARDNER, ORDER AND SURPRISE 109 (1983) (quoting Einstein).
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spite the fact that any account of the world-even physics, as Plato
said-is only a likely tale.201 The universe "is under no obligation to be-
have with such polite regularity;"' 02 it could have been other than the
ordered one we know. But it is not.
It may be that the universe that appears ordered to us is not ordered at
all, but that the order it has is only the order we see in it. Indeed, any
universe conceivable by the mind will be in some way ordered, if only
because of our own limitations, because we must see things in patterns
-abstractions-if we are to understand them at all.
Therefore, using these abstractions, we search. We become more in-
formed. We approach but can never attain full knowledge. In the
meantime, as a matter of policy (personal or otherwise) we operate on the
basis of knowlege we do have, ordinary or scientific, legal or economic,
more or less complete'whatever. We do this because, and we do it when,
to do without it would be even worse.
By this means, we come to know some things, if not with the finality of
eternity, at least with the degree of certainty that allows us to exist differ-
ently, perhaps even better, afterwards than before. We can, for example,
make adjustments for our knowledge that smoking is one of cancer's
smoking guns, even though we do not yet know all the relevant causal
links. Indeed, even if this knowledge is in the future found to be wrong in
certain ways-if, for example, "cancer" is not the right entity on which to
focus after we reclassify the world203we shall have had less of its suffer-
ing in the mean-time.
When to use such partial knowledge, and when instead to embark on
the inquiry again from its start, are things that we can know about as
well as we can know any thing at all. So when we make these decisions,
we must rely for the process of knowing on the same forms of knowledge
that are its products once done: that which is ordinary or scientific to us,
that which is ordinary or scientific to others.
Moreover, while we search among and draw upon these sources of
knowledge, the most difficult challenges may arise not from the dearth of
explanations but from the cacophony among which we must choose.20 4
201. F. CORNFORD, PLATO'S COSMOLOGY 28 (1937). Indeed, it could instead have been the case
that "everything would have been produced by everything and at random. Horses, for instance, might
be born, perchance, of flies, and elephants of ants; and there would have been severe rains and snow
in Egyptian Thebes, while the southern districts would have had no rain." 1 SEXTUS EMPIRICUS,
OtrrLsNES OF PYRRHONNISM 337 (Loeb ed., R. Bury trans. 1961 of 200 A.D. manuscript) (Bk. 3, ch.
5).
202. Gardner, supra note 200, at 110.
203. See supra notes 74-79.
204. "Most problems of theoretical appraisal involve . . . a three-cornered fight between two or
more rival theories and a body of evidence that is more or less satisfactorily explained by both theo-
ries." M. BLAUG, supra note 72, at 25-26.
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The competition may pit ordinary knowledge against scientific expertise
but it may also, or instead, pit scientific theories one against another, or
the common senses that we have against themselves.
Choosing among competing explanations is difficult under any of these
circumstances. For ordinary knowledge can be right but can also be
wrong, and this is true for scientific knowledge as well. Two theories that
are wrong do not make a right: Dr. Rush's bloodletting theory fared rea-
sonably well in the competition against others of its genre, and-when the
form of therapy was up for grabs-against the alternative of quinine bark
and wine.2 °5 In choosing among competing explanations, empirical testing
and internal standards for a theory may help us on some occasions; but at
other times, any rigid rules of discernment-or, to put it less delicately, of
guessing2°6-can lead us to the wrong.
What does make a difference is all these things: these rules, these hab-
its, wisely employed. In our choices among theories we must rely on em-
pirical knowledge, on intuition, on insight-but also on courage, on intel-
lectual interest, and on other (sadly) fuzzy, touchy-feely things. How else
can we know to reject bloodletting even when the experts say it is right,
but continue researching the wallflower rabbit, even while the rest of the
world is dancing? How else can we know, with more than hindsight, that
the era of the battle trial is effectively drawing to a close, indeed, that its
sphere has shrunken and vanished? And perhaps most difficult of all, the
question: How else can we know all these things at once, except by turn-
ing to the best judgment we can bring to our endeavors to find out? We
can do no more than that; more importantly, if we are ever to know, we
should do no less.
In our efforts to know more about law, we want to use economics
wisely-relying not only on the expertise economists can offer, but on the
ordinary knowledge all of us can bring, as well as lawyerly and other
expertise. It is neither wise to reject economics wholesale, as some would
do, nor to adopt it wholesale, as some might hope.207 The resolution of
conflicting explanations is difficult, but if we try, this too we can come to
know in some fashion. This resolution will not follow easy, obvious rules:
Some explanations will be simple; others complex. Some will derive from
technical economic models; others from frameworks already familiar
205. See Pernick, supra note 103, at 246.
206. See G. D. HARVEY, EXPLANATION IN GEOGRAPHY 35 (1969) (characterizing scientific
knowledge as "a kind of controlled speculation"); A. KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 126
(1964) (what characterizes scientific observation is deliberateness of search and control of process of
observation); POLYA, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS V, vi, 3-4 (1954) (plausible rea-
soning, such as in economics, draws upon experience in its attempt "to distinguish a guess from a
guess, a more reasonable guess from a less reasonable guess").
207. See supra notes 4 & 5.
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within the law."'8 Some models will be realistic; others, to be useful, may
have to abstract quite far.
When all this has occurred we will have knowledge-not perfect
knowledge, or even the best there ever will be, but more knowledge than
before about the order that is our world. There is much to be said for
understanding more about law and the behavioral response to it, for un-
derstanding law not just as it lays in the text, but as it plays in the courts.
To get to this point, however, we must be able to judge when common
sense is called for, with respect to Philadelphians or the blind; and we
must judge not only when bloodletting should be ended, but when rabbit-
watching should begin. When we have learned these things, when we
have done all this, we will know about the law what we did not know
before.
And then, we shall know yet one more thing-we shall know the won-
der, the joy, of knowing more. Like the mapmaker soaring high above the
mountains, The Economist with The Lawyer can show us what was not
visible before. True, it's not a free lunch. Quite the contrary. And yet in
the freedom of its vision is an occasion for delight.
208. Indeed, as Lawrence Friedman has pointed out, the latter two categories overlap. Friedman,
Two Faces of Law, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 13, 14 (economics "is a powerful, and quite general, tool of
analysis that everybody who writes or thinks about law uses, consciously or not. It is also. . . part of
the legal culture, at least for some aspects of the legal system").
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Reconstructing American Law. By Bruce A. Ackerman. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1984. Pp. viii, 118. $16.00
George L. Priestt
I do not know whether Tom Wolfe has reviewed Rawls' A Theory of
Justice,1 and I cannot remember a serious critique of Habermas or
Horkheimer in recent issues of People magazine. It is this novel intellec-
tual form, however, which the multi-talented Bruce Ackerman refines in
Reconstructing American Law.' The book's bold objective is to account for
the intellectual sources responsible for the expansion of federal govern-
mental activity since the 1930's. But Ackerman is not interested in the
inherent strengths or weaknesses of the justifications for government ac-
tion, nor quite in the influence of these ideas on the actual growth of
government. Instead, Ackerman is concerned with how policymakers, par-
ticularly lawyers, have talked about these ideas. The subject of conse-
quence to Ackerman is the relationship over the last fifty years between
justifications for government action and the content of what Ackerman
calls, variously, "law-talk," "lawstuff,"4 "legal discourse, ' 5 "legitimated
[legal] conversation,"' and the "new language of power."'7
This unusual approach represents a new and significant synthesis of
the central theme of Ackerman's scholarly work. In 1977, in the first book
of the series, Private Property and the Constitution,8 Ackerman described
two world views competing for control of modern legal culture-views
which he called "ordinary observing" and "scientific policymaking." Ac-
cording to Ackerman, each conception sought to dominate the characteri-
zation of modern legal issues by imposing different constraints on legal
language. The battle between them would determine control over "the lin-
- Professor of Law, Yale University. I am grateful to Owen M. Fiss and Anthony T. Kronman
for very helpful criticisms of an earlier draft, and to Franco Romani for encouragement, but I am
responsible for what remains.
1. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).







8. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977) [hereinafter cited as
PRIVATE PROPERTY].
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guistic practices of a special group of conversationalists . . . trained as
lawyers."' Ackerman illustrated the hypothesis by showing that the vari-
ous and confused approaches toward interpreting the takings clause were
only different elaborations of one of the two competing linguistic
methods."'
Ackerman's concern with language was generalized in 1980. In Social
Justice in the Liberal State,"1 Ackerman employed the method of "con-
strained conversation" as a technique for drawing out the implications of
his philosophy of neutrality.12 Here again, it was language or conversa-
tion that dominated the presentation, although the link to Ackerman's
concerns in Private Property was left totally obscure. In Social Justice,
dialogue and conversation appeared to serve chiefly as an organizing con-
ceit for Ackerman's argument. Ackerman hints in the book-although he
never really develops the point-that the preoccupation with conversation
about moral ideas is something more than conceit. Dialogue and conversa-
tion, of course, are methods of legitimating one's views about social policy.
But there is also a suggestion that the process of conversation possesses
moral significance in itself, derived in some way from its seemingly guar-
anteed success in leading individuals to confront and accept Ackerman's
moral imperatives.1 s
Reconstructing American Law reveals the unity and ambition of Acker-
man's vision over these many years. The book is a chronicle of a conflict
that Ackerman claims has dominated legal culture since the 1930's, pitting
the world view of the pre-1930's "reactive state" against the world view of
the "activist state" inaugurated with the New Deal. The conceptual ap-
proaches of the reactive and activist states closely resemble ordinary ob-
serving and scientific policymaking of Private Property.,, Moreover, the
battleground for the competition between these contrasting conceptual ap-
proaches is the content of dialogue about legal issues. In Reconstructing
American Law, however, the legal dialogue, the "law-talk," shows itself to
possess a new significance. In his earlier books, conversation represented
only a reflection of more substantive intellectual differences or a technique
9. See Ackerman, Four Questions for Legal Theory, 22 NoMos 351, 351 (1980) (describing ambi-
tions of Private Property and the Constitution) [hereinafter cited as Four Questions].
10. Id. at 351-53.
11. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL
JUSTICE].
12. Id. at 8-10; see Four Questions, supra note 9 (elaborating conversation theme of Private
Property and the Constitution).
13. See SOCIAL JUsTICE, supra note 11, at 357-75. For an effort to extend Ackerman's approach
to dialogue beyond its role in Social Justice itself, see Agger, A Critical Theory of Dialogue, 4 Hu-
MANITIES IN Soc'y 7 (1981); see also Weale, Book Review, 65 MINN. L. REV. 685 (1981) (discussing
role of conversation in Social Justice).
14. The link between "ordinary observing" as a conceptual framework and the commitment of the
reactive state to laissez-faire is made clear in Four Questions, supra note 9, at 367-69.
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for presenting a moral argument. In the current book, conversation itself
becomes the central phenomenon of importance. The ideas that form the
foundations of the contrasting world views are necessary to stimulate legal
conversation, but it is the subsequent conversation or dialogue about the
ideas that is truly important.
As we shall see, many unusual and peculiar conclusions result from
Ackerman's focus on conversation about ideas, rather than on the ideas
themselves. Indeed, Ackerman's approach initiates a truly novel form of
legal scholarship: the Rona Barrett theory of intellectual history. Accord-
ing to this approach, specific ideas are worthy of little attention. How
people talk about ideas is the matter of moment. Original ideas are only
minor source points for creative elaboration, in the same way that know-
ing what Henry Kissinger actually mumbled at Studio 54 would spoil the
fun.
I. A THEORY OF THE ACKERMAN PROJECT
Ackerman's subject is the transformation of the concept of law from
that of the "reactive state" of the 1930's to that of the "activist state" of
today.15 As Ackerman tells the story, policymakers prior to the 1930's had
complete faith in the just and efficient operation of competitive market
forces. They saw no need for the federal government to manipulate the
country's economic welfare or concern itself with questions of social jus-
tice. Moreover, America's geographic isolation eliminated the need for
more than minimal investments in military force." The thoughtful lawyer
viewed "self-conscious state intervention in the market economy as a rela-
tively extraordinary event." 17 The only relevant law was the common law,
whose role was dispute resolution.
This view of the world constrained the form and content of legal argu-
ment: "No legal argument [was] acceptable if it require[d] the lawyer to
question the legitimacy of the military, economic, and social arrangements
generated by the invisible hand.""8 The law served only to complement
the market, and legal issues were conceived of in terms of their market
analogues. The paradigmatic dispute was between two parties who to-
gether were "in the best position to develop the facts and values relevant
to a just decision."1 9 The dispute could be resolved in a manner consistent
15. The core of Ackerman's book appears as an introductory essay to a Symposium sponsored by
the Yale Law Journal on the role of the activist state fifty years after the New Deal. See Ackerman,




19. P. 26. Ackerman explicitly draws from the Kuhnian concept of paradigms. P. 60 n.16. Thus,
it is odd that he regards a reluctance to challenge the legitimacy of some prevailing conceptual frame-
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with governing principles of justice by asking a lay jury to determine
which of the litigants "deviated" more sharply from established market
norms.
2 0
The New Deal fundamentally contradicted this view of the role of law.
Most important, according to Ackerman, was "the sheer quantity" of
New Deal legislation,21 which reduced the common law from its preemi-
nent position to "only one branch of a trinitarian legal system," which
now also included "statutory enactment and bureaucratic practice . . . as
constitutionally legitimate sources of general principle."22
Yet although the New Deal repudiated the laissez-faire foundations of
the "reactive state"2 and generated a completely new legal order, it did
not affect the way policymakers talked about the law. Until roughly 1960,
lawyers and policymakers continued to view the law in "reactive state"
terms: to regard the competitive market as the norm and government in-
tervention as the deviation. How was this possible? According to Acker-
man, the post-New Deal contradiction between the law as it existed and
the law as lawyers understood it was mediated by Legal Realism. 24
Here, Ackerman's story becomes complicated. The intellectual mission
of the Realists was to destroy the theory that the individual common law
fields (property, torts, and contracts) were cleanly distinguishable and in-
ternally coherent.25 The belief in a coherent common law had inspired the
efforts of the first Restatements of Law, which were catalogues of princi-
ples of each of the common law subjects. The method of the Realists was
to unveil the "so-called organizing concepts of the common law" as
"empty boxes concealing a host of distinct fact situations that required a
sensitive response by Realistic lawyers with situation sense."28 According
to Ackerman, the essence of Realism was skepticism about abstraction and
confidence in intuition. 27 The Realists, however, were skeptical of all ab-
stractions. As a consequence, they successfully destroyed the theory of a
unified common law, but did not supplant it with their own affirmative
conception of law. Moreover, the Realists' emphasis on particularistic
complexity snuffed out all other efforts to create a theory of law consistent
with the extensive governmental intervention of the New Deal. Legal Re-
alism, according to Ackerman, was essentially "a culturally conservative
work as characteristic of only the reactive state world view rather than of all world views.
20. P. 27. The similarity of thinking of the reactive state to ordinary observing described in Pri-
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movement."28 Realism allowed the legal profession to "survive the politi-
cal crisis [of the New Deal] with its basic discursive equipment intact."2 9
The conceptual revolution that provided the vision for the modern ac-
tivist state was the Chicago School law and economics of Ronald Coase.
Coase provided "a model of a new form of power-talk,"3 0 in which every
human activity affects other human activities and all questions are ques-
tions of coordination. The Coasean approach compelled systemic, rather
than particularistic, examination of every problem of social policy. Acker-
man acknowledges the cautionary tenor of Coase's original article.3 " But
as Coase's article has come to be understood by lawyers, caution is mer-
ited only in the absence of transaction costs.32 In the real world, transac-
tion costs are always present. As a consequence, Coase's influence on the
"conversational domain" was to show a world characterized by pervasive
market failure.3 3 After Coase, understanding what is truly at stake in a
legal issue requires "the complex description of the ways in which actors,
constrained by heavy transaction costs and bounded rationality, are likely
to respond to an array of second-best legal interventions."34 For Acker-
man, Coase's Chicago School economics provides the conversational basis
for massive governmental intervention in all sectors of human life.
Coase and the economists, however, provided no guidance as to the val-
ues which such intervention should express. Instead, fashioning affirma-
tive values for modern legal discourse-what Ackerman calls reconstruct-
ing law-is the task of modern moral philosophers. Ackerman's careful
survey of modern moral philosophy identifies two philosophers in particu-
lar who have successfully influenced modern "Constructivist argument":
John Rawls in his well-known A Theory ofJustice 5 and Ackerman him-
self in Social Justice in the Liberal State."6
It is Ackerman's description of these two alternative moral approaches
that reveals the deeper conception of the book and its position in Acker-
man's intellectual project of the past decade. Ackerman does not regard
the modern moral conversation as complete; the reconstruction of Ameri-
can law is still in progress, and will continue for many years. As Acker-
man rigorously compares Rawls and Ackerman as alternative philosophi-
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wanting. Ackerman criticizes the abstract and alien character of Rawls'
technique of the veil of ignorance."' Moreover, according to Ackerman,
the bargaining metaphors that attend the decision process behind the veil
cannot be fully descriptive of "the basic terms of activist legitimacy," 38
presumably because consensual bargaining is the essential feature of the
now-deposed world of laissez-faire.
A superior way of determining the substantive values appropriate for
our activist state is "legal disputation itself.""9 Ackerman invokes our na-
tion's history as evidence: "When Americans think they have been de-
prived of their rights, they characteristically express their grievances in
legal terms-and insist that courts, no less than legislatures, take their
demands for justice seriously."' 40 It is the legal process of complaint and
answer that compels each citizen to frame "a legally acceptable response
to the question of legitimacy: What gives you, rather than me, the right to
the resource we both seek to employ?"4'
Here, the connection between Ackerman's moral philosophy and the
current book becomes clear. In Social Justice in the Liberal State, Acker-
man claims that all exercises of power require justification, and that all
questions of moral legitimacy can be resolved by invoking two principles
of neutrality: (a) no citizen's conception of the good is better than that
asserted by any other citizen, and (b) regardless of conception of good, no
citizen is intrinsically superior to any fellow citizen.42 The task of Social
Justice is to apply these principles to the wide range of questions of social
policy in order to define and justify the proper contours of our liberal
state.
The peculiar feature of Social Justice, however, is the technique Acker-
man adopts to define the implications of the neutrality principles. Acker-
man is not content with simple explanation or straightforward reasoning.
Instead, he addresses each issue by constructing an imaginary dialogue
between two individuals, in which, invariably, one asserts a position that
Ackerman opposes and the second invokes one of Ackerman's neutrality
principles at the right moment, shocking the other discussant into silence.
From my own experience, I suspect that many readers found these inces-
sant dialogues distracting, and increasingly tedious, although some review-
37. Pp. 94-96. Ackerman possesses a highly developed sense of the alien. Ackerman's philosophi-
cal technique is to present spaceship dialogues over the distribution of manna, moderated by his Space





42. SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 10-11.
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ers praised them as "fascinating" and characterized by "verve." 43 At a
minimum, the technique of "constrained conversation" appears to be a
very peculiar stylistic device because it bears no obvious relation to Acker-
man's substantive premises and conclusions beyond satisfying the require-
ment of legitimation. Toward the end of SocialJustice, Ackerman suggests
a grander role for dialogue: Dialogue by itself can lead individuals to ac-
cept the neutrality principles because it requires acknowledgement of the
autonomy of others and skepticism about the reality of transcendent
meaning."" Thus, there may be a double-faceted interrelationship between
dialogue and the neutrality principles: Dialogue as a legitimating method
is constrained by the neutrality principles. In addition, the technique of
dialogue requires its participants to confront their personal non-neutral
predispositions and may lead to acceptance of the neutrality principles.
But this argument is not fully developed.
Reconstructing American Law, however, reveals Ackerman's deeper
purpose and the unifying themes of his seemingly disparate scholarly
work. Ackerman the lawyer is constructing a moral philosophy of lawyer-
ing, and demonstrating that this philosophy, with the intellectual appara-
tus of dialogue that fuels it, can explain the most important development
in the United States and the western world of the past century: the tre-
mendous expansion of government and the rise of the activist state.
As I interpret Ackerman's idea (it has never been stated in these
terms),4 5 it is this: The legal process compels litigants to engage in a form
of argument in which one party makes a claim of right to which another
party must respond. This form of "conversation" leads parties to accept
values similar to Ackerman's neutrality principles."6 Ackerman, of course,
hopes to speed along this process by open advocacy of the neutrality prin-
ciples. The fundamentally dialogic character of the legal process, however,
suggests that it ought to be regarded as the central and fundamental
source of moral value in a liberal society, because of its role as a source of
moral training through argumentation and as the institution that ex-
presses and applies moral values of the greatest legitimacy in contexts of
competing moral claims. Certainly, the moral superiority of the legal pro-
cess to the democratic political process is clear.47 Conversation within the
43. Agger, supra note 13, at 11; Walzer, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1980, at 39, 40.
44. SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 357-75. Of course, dialogue is not a necessary condition
for the acceptance of these principles.
45. Ackerman gives a somewhat different-though I believe incomplete-account of his project in
The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1045 n.61 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Discovering the Constitution].
46. Presumably, the citizenry will accept these values once everyone becomes involved in
litigation.
47. Ackerman's preference for the judicial over the democratic process is criticized in MacRae,
Scientific Poliyinaking and Compensation for the Taking of Property, 22 NoMos 327 (1980).
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democratic process is of a much different character. Claims of personal
advantage, in some guise, are commonplace.' 8 Moral precepts, such as the
neutrality principles, may exert some suasion on the political conversa-
tion,49 but they do not act as determinative constraints as they do over
legal dialogue."
Thus, changes over time in the content of conversation within the legal
order describe the changing basis for the moral legitimacy of the state.
Ackerman demonstrated in Private Property and the Constitution that the
most important change in the legal conversation of the past century was
the shift from a world view that embraced legal reasoning using the con-
cepts of ordinary language and that was committed to laissez-faire to the
New Deal world view of scientific policymaking, which justifies and legit-
imates today's activist state. The current book, Reconstructing American
Law, presents the detailed history of this transformation in the legal con-
versation during the past fifty years. But because legal dialogue possesses
an inherent moral significance, Ackerman's book is more than history:
Ackerman's chronicle of law-talk is the record of our country's moral
growth.
II. LAW-TALK AND ITS SOURCES
I wish to make clear at the outset that I greatly admire Ackerman's
ambition and the sustained seriousness of his scholarly project. The expli-
cation of the sources of the expansion of government in western society
obviously is a subject of the greatest importance. To link the explication to
a coherent and defensible moral philosophy would constitute a stunning
intellectual achievement. Even on a more limited scale, a careful definition
of the relationship between legal scholarship and some set of dominant
conceptions of law is worthy of serious attention, and various of Acker-
man's specific points are highly compelling. Yet there is a peculiar charac-
ter to Ackerman's account of the activist state that calls for more detailed
examination.
I have mentioned that Ackerman's approach cannot be described accu-
rately as traditional intellectual history. Indeed, although Ackerman's sub-
ject is the influence of ideas on general conceptions of government, he
devotes no attention whatsoever to the original ideas themselves. Despite
the central role of Legal Realism-mediating the conflict between laissez-
48. For abundant illustrations, see B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR
(1981) [hereinafter cited as CLEAN COAL].
49. SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 275.
50. Ackerman's current project is to describe with more care those conversational constraints oper-
ative in the legislative and constitutional process. See Discovering the Constitution, supra note 45, at
1052-57.
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faire and the New Deal-there are only passing references to the writings
of the Realists. Similarly, though Ronald Coase is the hero of the
piece-because he provided the justification for the activist state-there
are only two references to Coase's writings, and none to any element of
the massive literature debating and expounding Coase.
Of course, Ackerman should be judged according to his argument rather
than his erudition, but the specific meanings that Ackerman attributes to
these writings are most curious. According to Ackerman, the legal conver-
sation has drawn from the writings of the Realists and Ronald Coase
messages that are exactly the opposite of the messages intended by the
authors and of the interpretations that most students of these authors have
long accepted.
For example, Ackerman describes Legal Realism as essentially a con-
servative movement whose approach permitted the legal order to retain its
commitment to laissez-faire principles and to ignore the revolutionary
changes that the New Deal introduced into the legal system.51 This is a
very unusual interpretation of Realism. First, the most important writings
of the Realists preceded the New Deal and, in particular, the "switch in
time" that Ackerman has identified as marking the triumph of the activist
state.52 Indeed, the more common interpretation of Realism is that the
movement helped prepare the way for the New Deal's triumph. 53
Ackerman concedes that Realist writings undermined the presupposi-
tions of the conservative legal order of the 1930's. But he characterizes the
Realists as only debunkers and neglects the dominant normative theme of
the Realist enterprise. Most Realists were strongly opposed to laissez-faire
and were sympathetic to, if not an inspiration of, the legislative and regu-
latory ambitions of the New Deal. It was not commitment to laissez-faire
economics and hostility to the activist state that put Jerome Frank and
William 0. Douglas at the Securities and Exchange Commission, Thur-
man Arnold at the Antitrust Division, and Walton Hamilton at the
T.N.E.C. Investigation.
Moreover, it is impossible to reconcile the Realists' empirical ef-
forts-which were by far the most distinctive aspect of the move-
ment-with sympathy to a laissez-faire legal regime. Realist empirical
work sought to show how limited the relationship was between the free-
market concerns of legal doctrine and the actual and more "realistic" con-
cerns of legal administration. The empirical work of William 0. Douglas
51. Pp. 11-22.
52. See Four Questions, supra note 9, at 368; Discovering the Constitution, supra note 45, at
1052-57.
53. See Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experi-
ence, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 459, 569-74 (1979).
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on bankruptcy5 and that of Charles E. Clark on law administration 55 and
automobile accidents56 sought to demonstrate that the normative commit-
ment of legal doctrine to laissez-faire principles ignored the most impor-
tant issues that faced judges, juries, and magistrates in administering the
law.57 This work was intended radically to undermine the legal regime
dominant in 1930, characterized by the approach of Lochner v. New
York,"S by showing that the principled coherence of the regime was des-
perately out of touch with the true problems of legal administration. The
radical nature of the Realist vision may appear limited in comparison to
modern critical thought. But it is the baldest form of anachronism to de-
scribe Jerome Frank, William 0. Douglas, and Thurman Arnold as lead-
ers of a conservative movement. Ackerman's focus on the Realists' faith in
intuition and "situation sense" is appropriate only to the work of Karl
Llewellyn,59 eccentric and idiosyncratic even in its own time.
Ackerman's description of the influence of Ronald Coase is even more
peculiar. As Ackerman tells the story, Coase is the founding father of the
activist state because his work convinced the legal community that market
imperfections were pervasive. Even the lay reader will appreciate that giv-
ing credit for the modern activist state to a central figure of Chicago
School economics is, well, a novel insight.60 But lay judgment aside, Ack-
erman's interpretation completely misreads Coase. There are two central
lessons in Coase's famous article.6" The first is behavioral. Coase demon-
strates that regardless of the law or of any initial allocation of resources,
the only obstacle to a subsequent reallocation is transaction costs. It fol-
lows that one can expect private parties to react to changes in the law by
rearranging their mutual affairs to preserve the optimal allocation of re-
sources (given transaction costs) and to seek always to reduce transaction
costs in order to facilitate future rearrangements.
The article's second lesson relates to social policy. By a variety of nu-
54. See Clark, Douglas & Thomas, The Business Failures Project-A Problem in Methodology,
39 YALE L.J. 1013 (1930); Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329
(1932).
55. Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration, 2 CONN. B.J. 211 (1928).
56. REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
(1932).
57. See also Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 44 YALE L.J. 387,
1291 (1935) (explicitly normative effort to reform civil procedure).
58. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
59. See Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224 (1942).
60. Oddly, in an earlier book of Ackerman's, The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality,
Ackerman documented how various government agencies commenced a form of systemic, scientific
policymaking with respect to pollution in the Delaware River during the 1950's nearly a decade
before the publication of Coase's article. See B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D.
HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974) [hereinafter cited as
UNCERTAIN SEARCH].
61. Coase, supra note 31.
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merical examples, Coase shows that no governmental intervention or non-
intervention can be shown to improve the allocation of resources. First,
there are technical limitations on any demonstration of allocative improve-
ment: Transaction costs cannot be measured; moveover, there is never suf-
ficient information available to understand ultimate economic effects."2
More importantly, because of the reciprocal nature of all incidents of so-
cial harm and the absence of adequately developed moral theories regard-
ing the multitude of activities affected by the legal system, changes in wel-
fare are always ambiguous. The particular implication of this conclusion
is that the Pigovian imperative of internalizing the costs of each factor's
operations in order to equate private and social costs is nonsense, and
cannot be shown to improve social welfare systematically.
These two lessons provide a very strange blueprint for an activist state
committed to curing market failures. Coase's message is ultimately nihilis-
tic. After presenting repeated examples in which attempts to correct mar-
ket failures only further reduce social welfare, Coase concludes that eco-
nomics provides no guide whatsoever to social policy. "As Frank H.
Knight has so often emphasized," Coase announces, "problems of welfare
economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and
morals."' s In fact, Coase's moral judgments over the years were pro-
foundly hostile to every form of the activist state. Coase explicitly dedi-
cated his work as editor of the Journal of Law and Economics to the
battle against governmental regulation." In his earlier work, Coase se-
verely criticized even the "expansion" of government in the sixteenth cen-
tury to preempt the private market for mail delivery.65 Coase's articles
condemning government regulation66 and those that he solicited and pub-
lished in his Journal formed the intellectual foundation for the deregula-
tion movement, which constitutes a sustained attack on the activist state 7
and the most serious commitment to laissez-faire since Mill's Principles of
Political Economy.
62. The argument of Coase's article is explained in more detail in Priest, The Rise of Law and
Economics, J. LEGAL EDuc. (forthcoming).
63. Coase, supra note 31, at 43.
64. See Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago,
1932-1970, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 163, 191-92 (1982).
65. Coase, Rowland Hill and the Penny Post, 6 ECONOMICA 423 (n.s. 1939); Coase, The Postal
Monopoly in Great Britain: An Historical Survey, in ECONOMIC ESSAYS IN COMMEMORATION OF
THE DUNDEE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 1931-1955, at 25 (J. Eastham ed. 1955).
66. E.g., Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1959); Coase, The
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee, 5 J.L. & ECON. 17 (1962); Coase, Payola in Radio and
Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 269 (1979).
67. Ackerman acknowledges the deregulation movement. See p. 32. He attempts to reconcile it
with governmental activism by interpreting the objective of the movement as "eliminating misbegotten
or obsolescent initiatives." Id. In my view, Ackerman's interpretation neglects the fundamental com-
mitment of this literature to a return to laissez-faire of the reactive state in place of governmental
activism.
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III. THE INTEGRITY OF LAW-TALK
It might be said that accusing Ackerman of misreading the Realists and
Ronald Coase misses the point. Ackerman does not purport to present a
standard intellectual history of the important literature of the past fifty
years. Perhaps it is enough that Ackerman is interested in describing the
dialogue or conversation between lawyers and policymakers that derived
from the writings of Coase and the Realists. The original texts themselves
should be considered only starting points.
This, I believe, is the most defensible reading of Ackerman's book, but
its shallowness is apparent. Ackerman does not define the relationship be-
tween original ideas and the morally loaded dialogue of interest to him, in
this book or in any other in the series. Nor does Ackerman present evi-
dence confirming his hunches as to the content of the legal conversation.
Clearly, Ackerman is not interested in dialogue between the original
scholars themselves, which could be expected to be true to the ideas of the
scholars. Nor does he seem to be interested in the dialogue about the orig-
inal ideas within the secondary literature" which would closely follow the
ideas. Ackerman does not explain how ideas are translated by policymak-
ers or, at yet a lower level, lawyers, in any systematic way that identifies
their dialogic positions.
What do we know about the development of dialogic content? From
Ackerman's history, we can infer that the post-Realist and post-Coasean
conversations bear no substantive relationship to the original texts from
which they are said to derive. The dialogues of interest to Ackerman are
in substance completely contradictory to the original ideas. One must con-
lude that at best these conversations are based upon impressions of the
original texts, filtered and finally perverted, in subsequent accounts. Put
more sharply, Ackerman's dialogue cannot be distinguished from uncon-
strained gossip about theories of government. The content of this gossip
may or may not bear any resemblance to the original theories themselves.
Ackerman may believe his history of law-talk, but its implications are
devastating to Ackerman's larger intellectual enterprise, if not to ninety-
nine percent of modern legal scholarship. If Ackerman's description is ac-
curate, he has shown that ideas have no coherent influence on social pol-
icy. He has demonstrated that in the world of governmental policy, a
scholar will gain equal credit for an original idea or for its converse. In-
deed, there is no link whatsoever between a theory or idea and how it will
be interpreted by policymakers. Lawyers and policymakers have engaged
for the last half-century in a dialogue inspired by the works of the Real-
ists and Ronald Coase that entirely neglects the substantive conclusions of
68. To which he makes no reference.
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these works. Although the Realists were regarded in their own time as
radicals, they were actually conservatives; Chicago School economists,
while openly and bitterly hostile to all forms of governmental interference
with the marketplace, actually elaborated upon and perfected today's ac-
tivist federal state.
It follows from this conclusion that the efforts of lawyers and legal
scholars to work out sensible and effective ideas about how the govern-
ment might act to improve the lives of its citizens are futile. However
brilliant and persuasive to scholars-and few scholars have failed to be
persuaded by the Realist attack on formalism or by the Coase theo-
rem-ideas have neither autonomy nor ultimate influence. Moreover,
Ackerman's conclusion implies that to criticize government behavior as
unreasonable or ill-founded 9 -that is, for its failure to conform to some
set of rational principles-is a foolish waste of time, because it ignores the
true source of influence. The dialogue from which policies are derived
need not correspond to any logical implication of its original premises.
If Ackerman's account is to be believed, the role of dialogue itself is
diminished from the lofty position suggested in Social Justice. If there is
no necessary connection between the content of dialogue and the original
principles that inspire it, how can we be assured of the moral integrity of
the dialogic process? Why will dialogue generate a commitment to neu-
trality as opposed to a commitment to personal domination or other non-
neutral positions? Must we not suspect that there are forces, other than
the dialogic process or the neutrality principles themselves, that are defin-
ing the content of legal dialogue?
One might answer that I am still judging Ackerman too harshly. Per-
haps Ackerman meant that the Realists and Coase serve only as emblems
of different conversational styles: of the conservative legal thought that
preceded the New Deal and of the systemic analysis characteristic of New
Deal policymaking. But this justification, I believe, undercuts the founda-
tion of Ackerman's project. If the Realists and Coase are emblems, then
Ackerman's conception of conversation has no coherent content. Acker-
man's definitions of the reactive and activist conversations become so
broad that they embrace totally opposing views on the central issues that
the conversations describe. The legal conversation of the reactive state em-
braces both a commitment to laissez-faire and Realist opposition to lais-
sez-faire. The legal conversation of the activist state incorporates both
New Deal regulation designed to supplant laissez-faire and Chicago-
school commitment to laissez-faire designed to supplant New Deal regula-
tion. Perhaps Ackerman has some deeper conception of activism and reac-
69. For one example, see CLsN COAL, supra note 48.
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tivism that transcends the simple chronology hinged at the New Deal. But
it remains unexplained.
IV. RECONSTRUCTING ACKERMAN
These criticisms should not be read to suggest that Ackerman's project
is unredeemable or hopelessly confused. No one doubts that the explana-
tion of the rise of the modern activist state is perhaps the central question
of modern political economy. Moreover, Ackerman's distinction between
the world views of ordinary observing and scientific policymaking are
powerful explanations of much of modern legal discourse. Prominent
scholars besides Ackerman have attempted to define the unique moral
forces of the legal process,70 and, in my view, Ackerman's insistence on
neutrality is a promising starting point.
Yet Ackerman's work in its current form stands as something less than
a coherent project. Each of the books contains insights that are imagina-
tive and that have influenced legal scholarship. But Ackerman aspires to
produce more than a collection of insights, and his readers should demand
more as well. In my view, Ackerman must elaborate five aspects of the
theory before it forms a comprehensive and coherent intellectual project.
First, Ackerman must define more clearly the moral significance of the
dialogic process itself. What moral force inheres in dialogue that is inde-
pendent of the moral argument of the dialogue itself? 1
Second, Ackerman must define more clearly the moral significance he
finds inherent in the legal process. Except as metaphor, the complaint and
answer of modern litigation, couched in strategic formality, do not closely
resemble a moral dialogue. Can Ackerman identify some moral content to
the legal process that is separate from the moral content of the legal rules?
Third, Ackerman must elaborate the relationship between the dialogic
character of the legal process and theories of the appropriate role of gov-
ernment. Private Property and the Constitution's review of litigation in-
volving the takings clause demonstrated persuasively to me that dominant
theories of government influence the structure of legal argument. But the
character and direction of the relationship has never been made clear. Has
the dialogic process of litigation somehow generated different theories of
government? Or is the legal process only a medium for the expression of
conceptions of government derived from other sources?
Fourth, Ackerman must consider how a new vision of government can
arise when preexisting conceptions of the world constrain the legal conver-
70. See, e.g., L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); Pound, The Economic Interpretation
in the Law of Torts, 53 HARv. L. REv. 365 (1940).
71. Michael Walzer makes a similar point in Walzer, supra note 44, at 40.
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sation as tightly as he suggests. More specifically, Ackerman must offer an
account of the origins, conversational or not, of the New Deal. The rise .of
the New Deal and of scientific policymaking is the central phenomenon of
Ackerman's entire enterprise. Yet Ackerman, to my knowledge, has never
attempted to explain the New Deal in terms consistent with his theory. In
Reconstructing American Law, Ackerman provides savvy commentary on
intellectual currents from mid-nineteenth century reactivism to late-
twentieth century law and economics. But the New Deal and its scientific
policymaking remain strangely (and damagingly) exogenous to the
account.
Finally, Ackerman must provide more convincing evidence that the ac-
tual growth of government is related to ideas about government-to the
translation of these ideas in the legal conversation, as well as to some
feature of the legal process. Ackerman seems committed to idealistic,
rather than materialistic, explanations of behavior and, in particular, of
government behavior. Yet his elaborate praise of Ronald Coase and the
central position he gives in many of his works to the economic approach
toward behavior 2 seem contradictory. Ackerman attempts to reconcile the
contradiction in Reconstructing American Law by characterizing economic
analysis as only relevant to a conception of facts, while some richer philo-
sophic framework can control policymaking.73 If world views and societal
conceptions are as dominant as Ackerman believes, this approach is un-
tenable. For Ackerman's project to be convincing, he must show the supe-
rior force of idealism to materialism as a determinant of government be-
havior and, perhaps, of individual behavior as well. The casualness of his
treatment of ideas in Reconstructing American Law suggests the contrary.
These problems stand as substantial obstacles to the completion of Ack-
erman's project. But consider the context of these criticisms. However im-
posing the obstacles seem, the project Ackerman has conceived is of far
greater dimension. Indeed, the ambition and sustained seriousness of the
author are extraordinary. There will be sufficient insight in any book by
Bruce Ackerman to make it worth reading. But Ackerman promises much
more.
72. See, e.g., PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 168-75; CLEAN COAL, supra note 48, at
66-74; UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 60, at 9-165.
73. Pp. 46-71.
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Breaking the Silence of Doctor and
Patient
The Silent World of Doctor and Patient. By Jay Katz. New York: The
Free Press, 1984. Pp. xxi, 254. $15.95.
Walter Wadlingtont
In 1910, a professional educator named Abraham Flexner confronted
the dismal conditions then prevalent among North American medical
schools. His celebrated Report on Medical Education in the United States
and Canada' has long been considered a major catalyst for the radical
reshaping of medical education that soon followed.2 A glance back at
Flexner's report reminds us of the primitive state of both medical science
and medical education earlier this century. In some schools, Flexner's
principal inquiry necessarily was limited to counting cadavers3 and bun-
sen burners, checking for running water, and determining admissions re-
quirements, if any.4 Such conditions may be difficult to comprehend for
anyone who has set foot in a modern teaching hospital. Today's experts
may worry that medical education has ossified5 in the Johns Hopkins
mold,6 but few would deny its success in training persons in the special-
ized skills needed to make use of the enormous technological achievements
of recent years. The public is generally confident not only that the string
of recent biomedical conquests will continue without interruption, but that
t James Madison Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
1. A. FWEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: A REPORT TO
THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (1910) (Bulletin No. 4).
2. Although the Flexner Report is widely accorded this credit, it has been suggested that the
movement toward reform already was under way by the time Flexner reported and that many of the
changes would have occurred in any event. See Kessel, The A.M.A. and the Supply of Physicians, 35
LAW & CoNTFmp. PRoBs. 267, 268-69 (1970).
3. In at least one instance, this did not require counting beyond one. See A. FLEXNER, supra note
1, at 205.
4. Many of the descriptions in the report are quite vivid. For example, one school was described
as having "a laboratory for histology, in which a small centrifuge is the only visible object of interest;
a small laboratory for elementary chemistry in a dark cellar; and an indescribably foul dissecting room
in a dark building, once a stable." Id. at 297.
5. See Chapman, Should There Be a Commission on Medical Education?, 205 SCI. 559, 560
(1979).
6. Johns Hopkins at that time was the model preferred by Flexner and subsequently adopted
widely by American medical schools. Its key feature was status as a graduate professional school
within a university, where students commenced with study in the basic sciences and then moved to
clinical training in a hospital.
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modern medicine will make it possible for many persons now alive to ben-
efit significantly from these developments as soon as they occur.
Given the great technological breakthroughs already incorporated into
modern teaching curricula and facilities, some might consider it audacious
to suggest the existence of any shortcomings in today's medical education
sufficient to justify critical examination by a latter-day Flexner. If there
are problems today as dire as those uncovered by Flexner, they do not
stem from the scientific dimension of medical training, but from the
human problems accompanying the new technology or exacerbated by it.
Individuals' increased willingness to turn to courts and legislatures to se-
cure rights to personal autonomy in many differing contexts7 prompts us
to question whether some of the long-accepted tenets regarding the
physician-patient relationship are antithetical to contemporary views
about personal liberties. If there is need for serious introspection or exter-
nal appraisal of medical education today, the critical area of focus is its
"humanist" content, with specific emphasis on the respective roles and
rights of doctor and patient.
It is the latter area, and some of the key problems within it, that Pro-
fessor Jay Katz addresses in The Silent World of Doctor. and Patient.8
Although many have written about this general subject in recent years
under the rubric of "informed consent,"' that term has become equivocal
in its legal meaning and its interpretation by physicians. In one sense
Professor Katz's book may be considered inextricably linked to "legal"
informed consent; one chapter is specifically devoted to it, and the entire
book is relevant to an appreciation of why this new legal doctrine devel-
oped, why confusion surrounds it, and why many regard it as having
failed to fulfill its original promise. But the book goes far beyond the
limited scope of informed consent: It perceptively analyzes the reasons
why physicians and patients communicate between themselves so sparsely
and ineffectively. Dr. Katz examines typical interactions between physi-
cian and patient today, explores the historical and psychological underpin-
nings of the relationship, and assesses the importance of reevaluating both
7. One illustration is the development of the right of privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) [hereinafter cited by page
number only].
9. For a cross-section of the informed consent literature, see C. LsDz, A. MEISEL, E. ZERUBAVEL,
M. CARTER, R. SESrAK & L. ROTH, INFORMED CONSENT. A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSY-
CHIATRY (1984); 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A REPORT
ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTI-
TIONER RELATIONSHIP (1982); Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and
Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340 (1974); Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision,
39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 137 (1977); Meisel & Roth, What We Do and Do Not Know About Informed
Consent, 246 J. A.M.A. 2473 (1982); Plant, The Decline of "Informed Consent", 35 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 91 (1978); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628
(1970).
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the traditional allocation of decisionmaking authority regarding medical
treatment and the flow of medical and personal information among physi-
cian, patient, and other interested persons. The result is a sensitive work
that should lead to some soul-searching introspection among physicians,
and that could well provoke serious reassessment of some key aspects of
modern medical training. It also presents some caveats for law reformers
concerning the potential effectiveness of steps they might be considering
for the purpose of affording patients greater participation in the decision-
making process.
I. A LONGSTANDING SILENCE
Dr. Katz begins by documenting how, from the time of Hippocrates
until several decades ago, few referred to any duty of physicians to con-
verse with their patients. The American Medical Association's first Code
of Ethics, published in 1847, is reprinted as an appendix. 10 Dr. Katz
urges that this lengthy and remarkable document, influenced by the work
of English physician Thomas Percival almost half a century earlier,
"should not be dismissed as a historic relic."1 Despite its replacement
with a short, modem version that provides few formal guidelines from
which one might glean the accepted tenets of physician-patient relations
and communication (plus a body of interpretative opinions by the AMA's
Judicial Council),' Dr. Katz suggests that "[t]he original sentiments, so it
seems, lived on in spirit, although not in the printed words, for physicians
were not given new and reasonably specific instructions on how to interact
with patients."1 "
The tradition of physicians' determining both what they should disclose
to patients and the extent to which physicians should ascertain and con-
sider patients' views in "packaging" or promoting a particular treatment
is longstanding. The simplistic, popular phrase, "You're the doctor," indi-
cates the degree to which our culture accepts the physician's decisionmak-
ing role. The 1847 Code of Ethics included a separate article with ten
subsections on "Obligations of Patients to Their Physicians." Subsection I
sets the tenor:
The members of the medical profession, upon whom is enjoined the
performance of so many important and arduous duties towards the
community, and who are required to make so many sacrifices of
comfort, ease, and health, for the welfare of those who avail them-
10. P. 230.
11. P. 22.
12. The American Medical Association Principles of Medical Ethics (1980) is also reprinted in an
appendix, at p. 237.
13. P. 22.
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selves of their services, certainly have a right to expect and require,
that their patients should entertain a just sense of the duties which
they owe to their medical attendants.14
Subsection 6 explains: "The obedience of a patient to the prescriptions of
his physician should be prompt and implicit. He should never permit his
own crude opinions as to their fitness, to influence his attention to
them."' 15 And subsection 7 admonishes:
A patient should, if possible, avoid even the friendly visits of a physi-
cian who is not attending him-and when he does receive them, he
should never converse on the subject of his disease, as an observation
may be made, without any intention of interference, which may de-
stroy his confidence in the course he is pursuing, and induce him to
neglect the directions prescribed to him. A patient should never send
for a consulting physician without the express consent of his medical
attendant. 16
For the physicians, article I of the Code advises that:
Reasonable indulgence should be granted to the mental imbecility
and caprices of the sick. Secrecy and delicacy, when required by pe-
culiar circumstances, should be strictly observed; and the familiar
and confidential intercourse to which physicians are admitted in
their professional visits, should be used with discretion, and with the
17most scrupulous regard to fidelity and honor . ...
Subsection 4 of that Article adds:
A physician should not be forward to make gloomy prognostications,
because they savor of empiricism, by magnifying the importance of
his services in the treatment or cure of the disease. But he should not
fail, on proper occasions, to give to the friends of the patient timely
notice of danger when it really occurs; and even to the patient him-
self, if absolutely necessary.""
No doubt there have been changes in physician demeanor and physician
confidence in their own capabilities since 1847. The individual physician-
patient relationship, however, still retains a near-sacrosanct status-a
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But from over a century ago, there remain many vestiges of rules about
how to deal with patients and to manage the decisionmaking process.19
While patients at one time might have accepted unquestioningly the phy-
sician's role as primary or absolute decisionmaker as an article.of medical
faith, this role is increasingly subject to question, criticism, and legal
challenge.
II. THE SILENT TREATMENT IN TODAY'S WORLD
Dr. Katz makes clear his belief that expanded participation by patients
in decisionmaking will not come easily. He suggests that the idea of shar-
ing the decisionmaking burden will itself create new tensions and also
bring out old ones. In chapter four, he examines the tension of author-
ity-should physician, patient, or both make decisions? The tension of au-
tonomy-can anyone but a physician decide?-is examined in chapter six,
in which he suggests that the term autonomy has been absent from the
medical vocabulary because doctors believe that patients lack the capacity
to participate in decisionmaking. He chooses to use the term "psychologi-
cal autonomy," which in his scheme "speaks to persons' capacities to re-
flect about contemplated choices and to make choices."20 He carefully ex-
plains his belief that "a comprehensive definition of individual autonomy
must take into account the conscious and the unconscious, rational and
irrational forces that shape all thoughts and actions .... ""
The third tension Dr. Katz addresses is that of uncertainty. Given the
extraordinary degree of technological achievement, one might ask whether
there is significant disagreement about the "correct" or appropriate medi-
cal treatment in many, if not most, cases today. If there is little or no
difference of opinion about what is deemed medically correct, the admoni-
tion of article II, section 7 of the 1847 Code of Medical Ethics2 -that
patients should not converse with doctors other than their personal physi-
cians-should be unimportant. But anyone familiar with medicine knows
this certainly does not exist. As Dr. Katz states it: "Medicine's vast igno-
rance about the etiology and treatment of disease places difficult, and at
times insurmountable, burdens on physicians both to sort out for them-
selves knowledge from ignorance and to communicate in a comprehensible
19. A largely historical chapter points out that the "age of science" in medicine in this country
began about 150 years ago, shortly before the 1847 Code described above. Pp. 30-47. This chapter
explains how it was the widely publicized discoveries of science that won public support for allopathic
physicians, who in effect won out in the power struggle to gain control of the monopoly of medicine.
Allopathic physicians relied upon more powerful medicines and their clinical intuitions, while homeo-
pathic physicians prescribed minute doses of drugs and followed stricter dogma. Dr. Katz concludes
that this delegation of exclusive power to one group of healers itself had a stifling effect on considera-
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fashion their certainties and uncertainties to patients." ' This raises the
question whether anyone-doctor or patient-can make an informed deci-
sion. In his chapter, "Acknowledging Uncertainty: The Confrontation of
Knowledge and Ignorance," Dr. Katz explores situations in which highly
regarded physicians disagree on the appropriate decision for particular
conditions. More alarmingly, he portrays a situation in which doctors may
reach a conclusion to which they cling resolutely even though scientific
support for it is tenuous. The differing approaches to radical mastectomy
provide one example of this phenomenon. Dr. Katz also uses this illustra-
tion to examine and explain the peremptoriness of some physicians' differ-
ing conclusions about the medical "correctness" of alternative procedures
without considering the patient's own highly personal views about matters
such as quality or length of life.
One might fault the use of the more spectacular "hard cases" as illus-
trations were they not integrated so well into the theme of the book. One
example is Katz's analysis of the encounter between Dr. Christiaan Bar-
nard and his second heart transplant patient, Philip Blaiberg, before that
highly experimental procedure was undertaken. One might easily come
away from Blaiberg's account with the sense that the patient was pre-
pared to undergo the procedure as much to help secure professional im-
mortality for the doctor as to lengthen the patient's own lifespan.' What
one gleans from the account of an interview with the doctor about his
encounter with Blaiberg, in contrast, is that Barnard sized up the patient
by some intuitive process to determine if-from the doctor's perspec-
tive-the operation was worth trying.25 He perceived the patient's enthu-
siasm as sufficient to support the belief that the operation was warranted.
There is no indication that the doctor sensed a special need for full dis-
closure even under these extraordinary circumstances.28
III. THE LEGAL DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT
The rule that competent patients must consent to their medical treat-
ment is basic in our law. In practice, consent usually is implied from the
patient's appearance before the physician in all but the more drastic or
dangerous medical procedures. And until the doctrine of informed consent




26. Nor does this concern for disclosure appear in the account of Dr. Barnard's interview with
Louis Washkansky, the first heart transplant patient. Pp. 135-36.
27. Although the early decisions of Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161 (1905), aff'd, 224 I1. 300,
79 N.E. 562 (1906), and Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92
(1914), contain language about patient self-determination in medical decisionmaking, these courts did
not develop the doctrine of informed consent in any sophisticated fashion. Dr. Katz suggests, and most
scholars probably would agree, that the doctrine as we know it today dates from the decisions in Salgo
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mechanism to ensure that the patient would be advised about risks he or
she would undertake by consenting to specific procedures. The key pur-
pose of obtaining a formal (typically written) consent to riskier interven-
tions, such as surgery, was to protect the doctor against intentional-tort
suits based on unauthorized invasion of the patient's protected interest in
bodily integrity-in short, to avoid a possible action for battery.2 The
doctrine of informed consent, which requires that a doctor give his or her
patient information about certain risks of the proposed procedure as well
as alternatives to it, eventually developed in the context of negligence,
however, rather than intentional tort. Thus, in theory, inadequate disclos-
ure under this new doctrine of negligence law would not vitiate the pa-
tient's consent secured for the purpose of immunizing the physician
against a successful battery action. To qualify as actionable under negli-
gence, the patient would need to prove a different set of elements, includ-
ing the existence of a particular physician's duty to disclose information
and the fact that whatever disclosure took place failed to meet the mini-
mum standard required under the circumstances. To satisfy the causation
element, it also would be necessary to convince the factfinder that, had the
appropriate disclosure been made, the patient would not have undergone
the treatment. Pigeonholing the action in negligence eliminated or mini-
mized the likelihood of punitive damages, which courts ordinarily award
only in cases of intentional torts such as battery, and even then only if the
plaintiff can show legal malice.29
Introduction of the doctrine of informed consent, even in this less severe
fashion, led to consternation and confusion in the medical world. The dis-
tinction between the consent needed to avoid a potential battery action and
the duty to disclose sufficient information for a patient to share more ef-
fectively in the decisionmaking process was variously misunderstood, mis-
construed, or repressed. Though the action in negligence almost certainly
presented less potential exposure in terms of tort liability than other de-
velopments, such as the expanded use of res ipsa loquitur 0 or the adop-
tion of a "discovery" approach to limitation of actions for medical mal-
practice, 31 many viewed the negligence action as a serious threat to
physicians individually in terms of liability, and to medical practice gener-
ally because of the changes in protocol that might be necessary to accom-
modate it. The latter concern no doubt was realistic in terms of the doc-
trine's potential for forcing physicians to engage their patients to a greater
v. Leland Stanford Jr. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957), and Natanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
28. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 14, at 26 (1965).
29. See Smith v. Courter, 531 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1976).
30. See Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975).
31. See, e.g., Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1977).
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degree in the decisionmaking process. Though some physicians obviously
have been influenced by the doctrine,"2 it is unclear whether many have in
fact altered their practices to involve patients in decisionmaking, and
whether the responses that have been developed are appropriate.
Courts long have accorded customary medical practice great weight,
however, in determining the standard of care under the negligence
formula."3 Thus, one issue that soon arose was whether courts would de-
fine informed consent by what patients would deem it appropriate for
them to know in order to make their decisions. Some jurisdictions, by
allowing physicians to set the standard for disclosure, effectively precluded
consideration of what patients individually or collectively might prefer.3 5
Of equal importance, some courts adopted an "objective" standard ("what
a prudent person in the patient's position [would] have decided if
adequately informed of all significant perils"36) to determine whether a
patient would have opted for treatment, thus effectively denying consider-
ation of personal factors that might have been of special importance and
persuasiveness to the individual patient. An illustration of this is the case
of the woman who chooses not to undergo a radical mastectomy because of
personal reasons regarding life-style or bodily integrity rather than lon-
gevity. While the objective standard no doubt affords great protection to
the physician, it does so at an unacceptably high cost to the patient. Dr.
Katz's arguments have convinced this commentator that consideration of
each patient's personal needs and concerns is essential to achieving the
original goal of informed consent, namely, shared and individualized
decisionmaking.
Dr. Katz deals specifically with the legal development of informed con-
sent in his third chapter. But throughout the book, he points out various
reasons that physicians have offered to explain why it may be undesirable
to disclose too many medical details or to involve patients too extensively
in the process of medical decisionmaking. As previously noted, one reason
is that patients are incompetent to make "correct" medical decisions, a
view that ignores the possibility that what might be considered "correct"
from a scientific standpoint might have a personally devastating effect on
32. The conclusions of the Lidz study, see C. LIDZ, A. MESs.SL, E. ZEmuBAVEI, M. CARTER, R.
SFSAX & L. RoTH, supra note 9, at 326, indicate that it is the informed consent doctrine rather than
the physician-patient relationship that probably has been restructured.
33. For example, courts require expert testimony to establish the medical standard. When courts
determine the standard as a matter of law in extreme cases, such as Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d
514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), they often are accused of "practicing medicine." For a discussion of expert
testimonyin cases involving informed consent, see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791-92 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
34. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 239-42, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 511-12
(1972).
35. See Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976).
36. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 246, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515-16
(1972).
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some patients. Courts have not been quick to incorporate this distinction
into law, as the previous illustration regarding the "objective" test for cau-
sation in informed consent actions illustrates. It may be informative to
note the remarks of one Justice of the United States Supreme Court who,
after observing that "[olne might well wonder, offhand, just what 'in-
formed consent' of a patient is," then responded:
[W]e are content to accept, as the meaning, the giving of information
to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its conse-
quences. To ascribe more meaning than this might well confine the
attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket
in the practice of his profession."1
Such a definition of informed consent may in fact be the widely used
model in practice; it also exemplifies the approach taken by some states
that have adopted statutes on the subject. 8 Nonmedical entrepreneurs are
selling pads of preprinted consent forms tailored to alert patients to the
risks of specific operations. Some hospitals give their patients books to
read about the dangers of procedures such as anesthesia. The obvious goal
is to explain the potential risks sufficiently enough to safeguard against
liability. Critics of such gamesmanship anticipate that someone will bring
an action for "overtell," based on the thesis that such impersonal measures
unduly deter patients from obtaining medical care to which they would
consent if there were adequate explanation of the need for it and the con-
sequences of not undergoing it. The legal doctrine of informed consent
thus has led to the development of a new set of confusing and counter-
productive practices, without necessarily contributing substantially to the
goal of more constructive interaction between patient and physician.
This should not come as a surprise. Just as we frequently expect too
much from medical technology, those who are concerned about the world
of silence between physician and patient may expect too much from the
legal system as a means for breaking that silence. The medical curriculum
is generally as lacking in serious conceptual offerings about law as it is in
courses on ethics. The thought that physicians might respond to the subtle
nudgings of the legal system by changing deeply rooted practices is too
optimistic. Not all lawyers are convinced that litigation is the appropriate
vehicle for change; many still support the proposition that the goal of tort
law is compensation rather than implementation of professional reform.
And even though some do consider tort law to be the most important
mechanism for maintaining quality control in the health care delivery sys-
37. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976) (Blackmun, J.).
38. Some statutes, for example, list specific risks that must be communicated to the patient if they
exist. For a review of the various informed consent statutes, see Meisel & Kabnick, Informed Consent
to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 407 (1980).
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tem, Dr. Katz's goal of protecting human dignity through subjective con-
sideration of individual patient's views may simply be beyond the effective
reach of tort principles. As an item of "preventive law," however, it seems
worth noting that despite the lack of empirical data on which to base their
advice, some lawyers counsel physician-clients that one of the best ways to
avoid being sued is to talk to patients. One rationale is that patients may
suspect that a physician who stops talking to them, or does not address
their problems after what the patient perceives to be an untoward result,
is in effect acknowledging fault. More important, it would seem, would be
for the attorney to counsel the physician that greater participation early in
the process would alert the patient to the possibility of a poor result and
thus would remove the patient's cause for suspicion.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ABANDONMENT
In his closing chapter, Dr. Katz asserts:
The history of medicine is the history of physicians' caring but silent
devotion to what they believed their patients' best interests dictated.
Doctors were rarely heard to invite patients to share the burdens of
decision with them. Instead, the voices heard were those of doctors'
hopeful and reassuring promises, however truthfully, evasively or de-
ceptively made, of doctors' orders, however gently or harshly uttered,
and of patients' compliant assent, however cheerfully or resentfully
given.39
He then suggests that "[wihen physicians did not listen to patients, or
responded perfunctorily to their questions, or dismissed their doubts and
concerns, patients felt abandoned.' 04
"Abandon" is a powerful word, both in the context of medical ethics
and of the legal duties inherent in the physician-patient relationship. Dr.
Katz clearly recognizes this. Though he explains that he is referring to
"psychological" rather than "physical" abandonment, his use of the term
indicates an intention to emphasize the significance of the problem. Given
the way in which tort doctrine develops in our common law system, one
might speculate about whether someone will attempt to force greater phy-
sician disclosure by asserting an action for psychological abandonment. Is
the concept any less feasible than informed consent was several decades
ago?
In the final chapter, Dr. Katz also addresses the special problems of
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recognizes that death seems to be the most taboo of subjects about which
patients wish to talk. He considers this to be equally true of physicians,
who "have an intriguing love-hate relationship with death: It is both their
ally and their enemy.' 1 As to the former, he points to instances of doctors
wittingly or unwittingly exploiting patients' anxieties about death to se-
cure obedience to medical orders. At the same time, doctors may consider
the death of their patients to be a personal defeat. The physicians' own
psychological needs may lead them to prefer "reassuring and hopeful non-
disclosure to disclosure of reality in situations of impending death. '42
V. Do WE NEED A NEW FLEXNER REPORT?
Dr. Katz believes that "[t]he radically different climate of physician-
patient decision making" that he envisions "cannot be implemented by
judicial, legislative, or administrative orders.' 3 Instead, he contends,
"[m]eaningful change can come about only through medical education and
the education of patients. Both physicians and patients must rethink basic
assumptions about their relationship and about mutual decision mak-
ing." 4" In a gesture to practicality, he acknowledges that physicians must
lead the way in such a process. For change to occur, physician-educators
must be prepared to address it in serious fashion.
It is interesting to speculate on whether development of the informed
consent doctrine would have been materially different had a study such as
The Silent World of Doctor and Patient been available during its early
formative period. Inadequate comprehension of the depth of the historical
and psychological roots of the concept of physician as decisionmaker prob-
ably contributed to some of the decisions that have caused the doctrine of
informed consent to be less than effective for accomplishing its underlying
purpose. Its inclusion within the negligence framework, for example,
probably made it inevitable that an objective standard would prevail in at
least some critical respects and that medical custom would play an impor-
tant role. Most importantly, it simply may be the case that a tort doctrine
cannot force such a radical departure from long entrenched habits and
strongly held beliefs, whether rational or irrational.
If Dr. Katz is correct in his assessment of the importance of developing
a new approach to physician-patient interaction, and in his conclusion
that the best, if not the only, way to effect such change is through educa-
tion, then we may need a detailed study of the ways in which medical
education perpetuates a paternalistic role in medical decisionmaking, and
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spawned by our expanding technology. Some medical schools now offer
little more than a series of brief consciousness-expanding sessions about
major social issues (in the "Plato to NATO in an hour" genre), consider-
ing that these topical gambols suitably discharge any educational responsi-
bilities in the field of ethics. Advocates of more extensive and innovative
instruction in the humanities and law often find that curriculum commit-
tees in medical schools are unable to make course time available for them.
But it is not the incorporation of humanities courses that is so key to Dr.
Katz's thesis; indeed, adding such courses may deflect attention from the
real problems at hand. What seems most needed is a combination of seri-
ous introspection by all physicians of their own approach to patients, and
an evaluation of how the present educational system socializes developing
physicians in this regard. If the latter task were undertaken, it would be
desirable for some of the examiners (no one examines anything without a
committee today) to be non-physicians, just as Flexner was. Some of the
more imaginative and potentially instructive work regarding issues of con-
temporary health care delivery is being produced by persons based pri-
marily outside the medical school environment. 45
The Silent World of Doctor and Patient may well upset many members
of the medical profession with its frank portrayal of physician-patient en-
counters that fail to recognize patients' individual capabilities to compre-
hend and reason, and that exclude patients' subjective concerns from be-
coming factors in decisionmaking about their treatment. Not all physicians
practice in such a manner; those who do so seem convinced that their
approach serves the best interests of their patients. Dr. Katz has set forth
the problem with perception and elegance. He has offered explanations,
often with a distinctly psychoanalytical base, as to why many seemingly
antiquarian practices persist in the face of enormous change on the scien-
tific side of medical practice. Though some may disagree with his concep-
tual explanations, or about his conclusion as to the avenue for necessary
change, such disagreement should not detract from the importance of this
provocative work. If taken seriously by the medical profession at large, it
could be a catalyst for voluntary change, thus obviating the need for even
a mini-Flexner study and helping to resolve confusion over the still-
floundering legal doctrine of informed consent.
45. Illustrations include R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL: A SOCIAL VIEW OF
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND DIALYSIS (2d ed. 1978); J. KEvr, THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL PROFESSION: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS, 1780-1860 (1968); P. STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
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